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 This dissertation contains three chapters that examine various behavioral 
responses to statutory tax policies.  In the first chapter, I develop a framework to estimate 
the impact of the marriage tax on the likelihood of marriage that incorporates into one 
analysis all four distinct household alternatives:  single, cohabit, married, and separated.  
This is in contrast to previous works tha t consider only one of three separate choices.  
Using data from the March CPS from 1989-1999, I estimate a bivariate probit model and 
find that the marriage tax has a small, but significant, effect on the likelihood of marriage.  
Furthermore, my results indicate that studies that do not include all four possible 
alternatives can overstate by as much as 200% the effect of the marriage tax on the 
likelihood of marriage. 
The second chapter considers the net distributional impact of the federal tax 
deduction for charitable donations. If itemizers, who tend to have higher income than 
non- itemizers, give to charities that provide goods that they directly use or benefit from 
(egoism), the government is essentially subsidizing the activities of the high- income 
 vi 
donors.  Conversely, if itemizers donate to organizations that benefit the needy (altruism), 
the tax deduction aids in a form of income redistribution.   I estimate this tax 
responsiveness of giving using the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) module 
of the PSID in 2001 and 2003 for 11 types of charities.  Donations by high income 
individuals to charities that benefit the poor are more price elastic than donations to 
charities that benefit themselves.  I find evidence that the current tax deduction induces 
itemizers to donate more to charities that benefit the poor than they would have without 
the deduction. 
The third chapter estimates the economic incidence of the excise tax on tobacco.  
Using historical price and tax data from 1954-2005, I estimate what portion of the tax is 
shifted to consumers.  I experiment with controls for border crossing and indoor smoking 
bans.  I find that a 10-cent  tax increase causes price to increase by 8 cents immediately 
and by 13 cents in the long run. 
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CHAPTER 1:  HOUSEHOLD FORMATION AND THE “MARRIAGE TAX”:  
SHOULD I BE SINGLE, COHABIT, MARRY, OR SEPARATE? 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The personal income tax system in the United States defines the family as the unit 
of taxation.  This distinction can cause married and unmarried couples with the same 
level of income to face different tax schedules, entirely due to their marital status.  The 
resulting inequity is commonly called the “marriage tax”, although this tax could be 
positive or negative.  Basic economic theory tells us that individuals respond to 
incentives.  Using data from the March CPS from 1989-1999, and calculating tax 
liabilities using the NBER’s TAXSIM, I find evidence that couples who do not marry 
face a larger marriage penalty than married couples.  For instance, married couples in 
these data receive an average marriage subsidy equal to $178.65 while unmarried couples 
would face an average marriage pena lty of $100.34 if they were to marry.  Thus, one 
might expect that a larger marriage tax might decrease the average marriage rate, all else 
equal.   
This very hypothesis is explored in a growing body of literature that seeks to 
determine the effect of the marriage tax on the decision to marry which includes Alm and 
Whittington (1999, 2003), Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002), and Eissa and Hoynes 
(2000b).  These authors each estimate the choice between one of three combinations of 
two alternatives:  the probability that unmarried people marry, the probability that 
cohabiters marry, and the probability that married couples separate.  In general, they find 
that the tax has a negative, but tiny, effect on the likelihood of marriage.   
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 None of the existing literature incorporates simultaneously into one model the 
four distinct alternatives:  stay single, cohabit, marry, or separate.  If all four alternatives 
are related, then the omission of any two choices may lead to biased estimates. For 
example, two single ind ividuals do not have marriage as their only option.  Instead, they 
could cohabit.  In my framework each couple at each point in time can choose to be 
single, cohabit, marry, or separate.  I develop an empirical model that allows each couple 
to choose one of these four alternatives, and that allows the tax law to influence these 
decisions.  Comparisons of results between previous works are difficult not only because 
they examine the choice between different alternatives, but also because they measure the 
tax cost of marriage differently.  I estimate my models using two different computations 
of the marriage tax.  This allows me to judge if the tax cost variations in the literature are 
the cause of differences in the results.   
 I find that the net effect of the marriage tax on the likelihood of marriage is 
negative, but small, when all four possible alternatives are considered.  Ultimately I want 
to know if the inclusion of all four alternatives yields different results from the models in 
the existing literature.  Since each study uses a different data set, I also estimate a two 
alternative model where individuals can either marry or not, as in the previous works.  
The estimated tax price elasticity of marriage for household heads equals 0.0005 in the 
model that includes all four alternatives.1  This is in contrast to 0.0009 and 0.0016 when I 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter I use marginal effect to represent the change in the dependent variable for a given 
level change in the independent variable.  So, the marginal effect of the marriage tax on the probability of 
marriage indicates the percent change in the likelihood of marriage for a dollar change in the marriage tax.  
This is in contrast to the elasticity, which represents the percentage change in the likelihood of marriage for 
a percent change in the marriage tax.   
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consider the choice between only two alternatives.  Thus, I conclude that not delineating 
all four outcomes can overstate the effect of the tax on marriage by as much as 100%. 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 contains a discussion of the implicit 
marriage tax as well as various methods employed in the literature of calculating this tax.  
Next, in section 3, I discuss the growing body of research that attempts to measure the 
effect of the marriage tax on marital decisions.  I present my theoretical framework and 
specification in section 4.  The data and results from this estimation procedure are 
contained in sections 5 and 6, respectively.  Finally, section 7 concludes and contains a 
discussion of other avenues to pursue in future research. 
2.  BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MARRIAGE TAX 
 The marriage tax is not an actual tax.  Policymakers never sat down and said, 
“Let’s levy an extra tax on married people!”  Rather, it is a reality of any tax system with 
graduated marginal tax rates and the family as the unit of taxation.  Rosen (1977), Lovell 
(1982), and Berliant and Rothstein (2003) each show that it is impossible to have a tax 
system that is non- linear, marriage-neutral, and horizontally equitable.  Through its 
graduated tax schedule and goal of horizontal equity between families, the U.S. tax 
system therefore, necessarily violates marriage neutrality.  Specifically, the differences in 
personal exemptions as well as tax bracket cutoffs for married and unmarried persons 
work together to create the marriage tax.   
 A large body of literature explores which individuals face this tax, and how it has 
changed over time, including Rosen (1987), Feenberg and Rosen (1995), Cataldo (1996), 
Alm and Whittington (1996) and Whittington and Alm (2001).  In general they 
demonstrate that a pair of individuals with similar earnings tends to face a larger marriage 
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penalty because marriage pushes them into a higher tax bracket.  Likewise, couples with 
dissimilar earnings may actually be in a lower tax bracket after marriage and could 
receive a marriage subsidy.  Low-income families can face a particularly severe tax if 
they are pushed out of the bracket for Earned Income Tax Credit eligibility.  In addition, 
Alm, Whittington, and Fletcher (2002) point out that the existence of a marriage subsidy 
implies a “singles tax” for many unmarried individuals.   
2.1 DEFINITIONS OF THE MARRIAGE TAX 
While it may seem simple to determine the level of the marriage tax, several 
different calculations are employed in the literature in ways that depend on the available 
data.  The first, used by Eissa and Hoynes (2000a and 2000b) among others, calculates 
the total tax due as a married couple and compares it to the sum of the taxes owed for 
each partner if they filed as single (or head of household).  The difference between the 
two is called the tax cost of marriage.  This approach is typically used when data are 
observed for married couples, and then a separation must be simulated for each couple to 
determine the tax if unmarried.  For a married couple with individuals i  and j  , and with 




( ) ( )
, , ,
1 1
, ,0, , , ,
2 2
i j i j married
i i j single j i j head
T t E E UE UE K S
t E UE UE S t E UE UE K S
≡ + + −
    + + +        
,  (1.1) 
where E     = earnings 
 UE  = unearned income 
 S     = tax schedule:  (for married, single, or head of household). 
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Thus, equation (1.1) states that the marriage tax equals the joint tax liability while 
married less the sum of the tax liability as head of household for the partner that receives 
custody of the children, person j , and the tax liability as single for the other partner, 
person i .  Given data limitations, several assumptions are key in this approach.   
(i) Everyone takes the standard deduction. 
(ii) Unearned Income is split equally when not married. 
(iii) Custody of any children 
a. Eissa and Hoynes (2000a,b), Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999) assume 
that the female receives custody and files as head of household upon 
divorce. 
b. Rosen (1987), Feenberg and Rosen (1995) assume that the spouse with the 
highest earned income receives custody upon divorce. 
 
My data are similar to theirs, so I must make similar assumptions.  I try it both ways.  
That is, I use WT  to denote the marriage tax as defined by equation (1.1) when j  
represents the woman who receives custody of any children and files as head of 
household when unmarried.  Similarly, PET  denotes equation (1.1) when j  represents 
the primary earner.   
That approach yields the marriage tax for the couple, and this T  is assigned to 
each individual within the couple faced with the decision to marry.  To get the marriage 
penalty faced by an individual, Alm and Whittington (1997, 1999) assign each person a 
share of the total tax liability when married and then subtract the appropriate (single or 
head of household) unmarried tax liability.  To calculate the share of married tax liability 
for the primary earner, that person’s income is taxed according to the married tax 
schedule, while for the secondary earner, that person’s income is added to the primary 
earner’s income and then taxed at the resulting higher marginal tax rate of the graduated 
tax brackets for married couples.  For both, the tax liability while married is determined 
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by the married tax schedule, but only the secondary earner’s share of the tax while 
married is a function of both incomes.  If the two incomes are very dissimilar, this 
method allows the primary earner to receive a marriage subsidy while the secondary 
earner experiences a marriage tax.  A problem with this measure is that it assigns 
different tax incentives to the two individuals considering marriage, even though it is a 
joint decision that could easily involve some kind of bargaining over reallocation of 
resources inside the household aft er marriage.  If net income is shared equally, for 
example, then both are equally affected by the marriage tax (or subsidy).  Thus, I 
compute the marriage tax according to equation (1.1), which assigns the same tax cost of 
marriage to each partner.   
3.  PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 Studies that examine the effect of the marriage tax on marital decisions can be 
grouped into three categories.  The earliest works use time-series data to draw 
conclusions about aggregate marriage rates.  The second wave uses individual household 
data to estimate hazard models of the length and timing of marriage and divorce.  Finally, 
those in the third group explain static individual level decisions to marry.  
3.1  AGGREGATE MARRIAGE RATES  
 Alm and Whittington (1995a) use time-series data spanning 1947-1988 to 
estimate the effect of the marriage tax on the aggregate marriage rate.  They define the 
marriage tax as the difference between the tax if married and the sum of the singles taxes 
for males and females, all evaluated at median levels of income.  With the percent of 
women age 15-44 that are married as the dependent variable, they find a marriage-tax 
elasticity that is negative and less than 0.05 in absolute value for every specification used.  
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Thus, the tax does have a slightly negative effect on marriage, but it is very small.  
Sjoquist and Walker (1995) use the percent of unmarried women that marry in a given 
year between 1948 and 1987 as their dependent variable, and find the marriage tax has no 
significant explanatory power.  However, they do find evidence that the marriage tax may 
lead some couples to postpone a marriage until the following tax year, although the effect 
again is very small. 
Later the same year, Alm and Whittington (1995b) explore the contrast in these 
two results – one showing a small negative effect on the marriage rate, and the other 
showing no effect.  They conclude that these time-series estimates are sensitive to the 
specification and method of estimation.  Specifically, any estimated effects of the tax on 
marital decisions are small and likely do not affect many individuals.  Thus, they propose 
using individual level data in the future. 
3.2  LENGTH AND TIMING OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
 The second wave of research focuses on the timing of various marital decisions.  
Using longitudinal data from the PSID, Alm and Whittington (1997) estimate the 
probability of delaying marriage as a function of the marriage tax for individuals in the 
sample who do eventually marry.  Their estimates indicate that the marriage tax may lead 
to a delay in marriage for less than 2 percent of couples.  Alm and Whittington (1999) use 
the same data to estimate a discrete hazard model of time until first marriage.  For 
women, they find that the difference in tax liabilities between married and single women 
leads to a small, negative impact on the likelihood of marriage.  Conversely, the same 
effect for men is insignificant.   
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In a separate 1997 paper, Whittington and Alm use a similar model to estimate the 
probability of divorce as a function of the tax for individuals in their first marriage.  The 
marriage tax here leads to a larger, positive effect on the probability of divorce.  The 
magnitude varies between men and women, however.  In particular, for women the 
estimated marriage tax elasticity ranges from 0.73 to 1.05 depending on the definition of 
the marriage tax, while for men the elasticity is around 0.38.  While the influence of the 
tax on a particular individual is small in all three of these cases, the impact is still 
significant.  Thus, they conclude that the tax differential influences some marital 
decisions, at least at the margin.  
The differences across genders in these results are misleading since their 
definition of the marriage tax gives the entire disincentive to the secondary earner 
(primarily women), while the primary earners (men) enjoy a subsidy, on average.  The 
decision to marry is made by a couple, and each partner should experience the same net 
tax consequences. 
3.3 PROBABILITY OF MARRIAGE 
 The third category includes research that examines the probability of marriage 
given that the individual is single or cohabits, as well as the probability of divorce or 
separation given that the individual is married.  In addition to the tax cost of marriage 
from the federal income tax, some of these papers consider various transfer programs and 
the EITC for low-income families.  Table 1.1 provides a succinct listing of these papers, 
grouped by the alternatives that they consider.  In general, they all find a negative, but 
small, effect of the tax penalty on the decision to marry, regardless of the alternatives 
considered, or the measurement of the penalty.   
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Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002) are the only ones to consider single people, 
though they do not do so explicitly.  They estimate the decision to marry for a sample of 
unmarried women that includes single women as well as cohabiters as a function of 
changes in the EITC for low-income women.  They find that the EITC has no effect on 
the probability of marriage for unmarried women with children.  For married women with 
children, however, the EITC does affect the decision to remain married with an estimated 
elasticity of marriage of 0.011.  Thus, if the EITC is higher when not married, the 
probability of marriage declines.  Dickert-Conlin (1999) finds an even smaller elasticity, 
0.0041, when considering jointly the changes in federal income tax liability and the 
benefits received from various transfer programs for low-income women. 
Eissa and Hoynes (2000b) and Alm and Whittington (2003) both estimate the 
likelihood of marriage given cohabitation.  A main difference is that Eissa and Hoynes 
utilize a repeated cross-section of individuals from the March CPS, and thus do not 
observe if a cohabiter actually marries.  Rather, their estimates rely on the percent of 
individuals that are married or cohabit in a given year.  In contrast, Alm and Whittington 
use a panel data set and observe changes in marital status for specific individuals.  The 
marginal effect of the marriage tax with respect to marriage in the Alm and Whittington 
analysis is -0.00002, which is much smaller than the -0.004 that Eissa and Hoynes find.  
However, this difference is not necessarily due to the advantage of longitudinal data.  
Rather, Eissa and Hoynes consider only women, while Alm and Whittington include both 
men and women.  In addition, they define the tax cost of marriage somewhat differently.  
Eissa and Hoynes use TW while Alm and Whittington use TPE.  As I illustrate using my 
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data in Section 5, the use of WT  leads to an average marriage subsidy for married 
couples, while the use of  PET  leads to an average marriage tax.   
The tax elasticity of marriage ranges from 0.011 to 0.100 in these studies.  
However, these variations are difficult to compare due to the lack of a consistent measure 
of the marriage tax as well as differences in the groups of individuals considered.  In 
addition, each study considers a choice between only two alternatives.  At a given point 
in time, an individual does not have just two alternatives.  For instance a couple that 
cohabits does not have marriage as its only option -- it could also split up and become 
two single individuals.  Similarly, single individuals can choose to marry, or they could 
instead choose to cohabit.  The omission of this other choice may lead to biased 
estimates, a problem that is addressed in my analysis.  I incorporate all four alternatives 
(single, cohabit, married, separate) into one model and then determine the effect of the 
marriage tax on the probability of marriage. 
4.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 Every period in my model each individual simultaneously makes two choices.  
One choice is whether to live alone or not (that is, to live with any other adult in a 
partnered relationship or not).   The other choice is whether to marry or not.  Jointly, 
these two choices yield the four possible alternatives depicted in Figure 1.1.  Thus, the 
word “single” in this analysis includes only persons who are both not married and not 
living with a partner.  Those who live with an unrelated adult and are unmarried are said 
to “cohabit”.  The term “married” here includes all those with a legal marriage who also 
reside in the same household as their spouse; individuals are called “separated” if they 
reside in a different household from their spouse.   
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FIGURE 1.1  FOUR STATES FOR HOUSEHOLD STATUS 
 Marry Not Marry 
Alone Separated Single 
Not Alone Married Cohabit 
 
The traditional approach is to use the theory of marriage and equilibrium of the 
marriage market developed by Becker (1973, 1974).  In short, individuals marry if their 
utility while married is greater than while not married.   Utility, then, is a function of 
marital status ( 0,1)M = , household production ( )MZ , tax liability ( )MT , and individual 
characteristics ( )X .  Both household production and tax liability are dependent on 
marital status.  Thus, in the traditional approach utility could be represented by 
( , , ; )M MU U M Z T X= .  Eissa and Hoynes (2000) note that this approach “makes no 
distinction between legal marriage and cohabitation…and therefore is just as applicable 
to analyzing cohabitation” (p.11).  In other words, the important point about household 
production is not whether the pair of individuals are married or not ( )MZ , but whether 
they live alone or not (  for 0,1)AZ A = . 
 My framework attempts to disentangle cohabitation from marriage (and separated 
from single) by combining the decision to live alone with the decision to marry.  Each 
individual simultaneously chooses alone and marry.  I represent an individual’s utility as  
 ( , , , ; )A MU U A M Z T X=  (1.2) 
where A  and M  are dichotomous variables that represent the alone and marry decisions, 
respectively.  Household production ( )AZ  changes with alone status and includes things 
like household income to proxy for the added economies of scale and “marriage market” 
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characteristics.  The tax cost of marriage, MT , is simply the difference between the tax 
liability while married and the tax liability when unmarried.  Each individual chooses the 
household status that yields the greatest utility.   
Note that I assume that Z  directly affects only the alone decision, and that T  
affects only the decision to marry.  The marriage tax affects whether to marry, but given 
that choice, it has no effect on whether the individual lives alone or cohabits.  As a result, 
the tax cost of marriage has the same effect on marry for all unmarried persons, whether 
they are single or cohabit.  Likewise, the former assumption is that household production 
variables affect alone, but given that choice, they have no effect on the decision to marry.  
The added economies of scale and extra household income that come from living with a 
partner have no direct effect on marriage in this setup.  “Marriage market” variables, like 
male/female ratios, are used in the Becker framework as a proxy for availability of a 
partner. Yet, this partner does not necessarily need to be a spouse in a legal marriage.  
Thus, I call these types of variables “partnership market” variables and use them as 
determinants of whether or not an individual will live alone in AZ . 
These two exclusion restrictions are necessary in order to identify the alone and 
marry decisions in the procedure that follows.  I estimate a bivariate probit which 
includes an estimate for the correlation between the alone and marry decisions.  If the 
correlation does not equal 0, then the marriage tax can affect the alone decision indirectly 
through the likelihood function.  Likewise, the variables in AZ  may have an indirect 
effect on marry.     
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To parameterize this model, I define *A  as the difference in utility between the 
two alone states (for a given M ). 
 * * *1 0(1, , , ; ) (0, , , ; )M MA U M Z T X U M Z T X= −  (1.3) 
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which formalizes the alone decision of the individual. 
 In a similar fashion, an individual chooses to marry, given 0A =  or 1A = , 
according to: 




1  if  M 0






Thus, the individual marries if the utility of marriage is higher than the utility when not 
married. 
 Next, I assume a linear form for the indirect utility function, to arrive at the 
following equations: 
 *iA iZ Xα β δ ε= + + + , and (1.7) 
 *i i iM a bT dX ν= + + + . (1.8) 
It follows that an individual lives alone if  iZ Xα β δ ε+ + >   and marries if  
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Summing over the probabilities of the four states forms the following likelihood function: 
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= − > ≤ + − ≤ ≤
+ − ≤ > + > >
 (1.10) 
This can be solved by maximized likelihood.  Note that this is exactly the procedure 
known as bivariate probit when the error terms are distributed bivariate normal.  If the 
correlation coefficient between the two error terms, ρ , is zero, then this is equivalent to 
estimating equations (1.7) and (1.8) with separate probits.  In this case, “individuals” and 
“separated” persons with identical characteristics could have the same *iA , and similarly 
“married” and “separated” persons with identical characteristics could have the same *iM  
since marry does not enter into equation (1.7) directly, and conversely equation (1.8) 
does not contain alone.  This implicit assumption has the potential to be restrictive if the 
two equations are estimated separately.  However, because I assume that together they 
are distributed bivariate normal and that ρ  does not have to be zero, the probability of 
each outcome, ijP , and the marginal effects of the covariates each depends on the joint 
estimation of the two equations.  For example, the marginal effect of a demographic 
variable kX  on alternative married in this model can be computed as follows: 
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(1.11) 
where AX  is a matrix of all the covariates in the alone equation and MX  is a matrix of all 
the covariates in the marry equation, Aγ  and Mγ  are the estimated coefficient vectors 
corresponding to AX  and MX , and ρ  is the estimated correlation coefficient.2  If ρ  is 0 
then the effect condenses to those found in a single equation probit.  When ρ  is not 0, all 
of the coefficients from both equations affect each individual marginal effect and 
predicted probability.  
 Identification is achieved because the tax cost of marriage is excluded from the 
alone decision, while the household production and partnership market variables are 
excluded from the decision to marry.  In addition, since I use cross-sections from 11 
years (1989-99), tax cost variation is achieved both by the various changes in the 
statutory code over time (brackets, marginal tax rates, standard deductions, and the EITC) 
as well as by the cross-sectional variations in the tax cost of marriage for those with 
various income and household characteristics.  
 The fact that I exclude household production from the marry equation could be 
problematic if marriage behavior is in fact influenced by these variables.  For instance, 
some religious couples cannot cohabit and thus cannot enjoy the added economies of 
scale of a two person household unless they marry.  This assumption, while necessary for 
identification of the model, may prove to be restrictive if it is not representative of actual 
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behavior.  A potential solution to this is the multinomial logit where the individual makes 
one choice over the four alternatives as well and no exclusion restrictions are necessary to 
identify the model. A major disadvantage, however, is the implicit assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives.  Ex ante this assumption does not seem 
appropriate for my model.  For a pair of individuals, the choice to be married is not 
independent of the choice to cohabit if the marriage tax matters.  For a married couple, 
separation is not independent of divorcing and living alone.  As expected, this 
specification fails the Hausman test for IIA. 3  I conclude that the bivariate probit model is 
a more appropriate representation of the individual’s decisions and the data.4 
5.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICS 
I use data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Survey for the years 1989-
1999.  This data set has its advantages and disadvantages, but for my purposes the pros 
outweigh the cons.  For instance, tax data have rich information on income, and accurate 
assessments of tax liability.  Using CPS data requires that tax liability be estimated or 
constructed somehow, and the various assumptions required to do so may cause problems 
in the results.  However, my analysis requires the distinction of household structure 
(single, cohabit, married, separated), which is not available from tax return data.  
Likewise, the CPS data have an abundance of other basic demographic variables not 
found in tax data.   
 First, I must separate each individual into one of the four groups.  An unmarried 
person who resides in a household with no other adults is classified as “single”.  A 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Greene (1998) for derivation. 
3 Results available upon request.   
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“cohabiter” is any unmarried person who lives with one, unrelated, adult of the opposite 
sex.  This definition necessarily omits groups of three or more adults that reside together 
(even if two of them are technically cohabiters, which I cannot tell from the data).  In 
addition, I exclude all households with only two same-sex adults, since the decision to 
cohabit rather than marry is different for homosexual couples during this time period.  
They are not included in the legal definition of marriage, and the marriage tax is not 
something that could possibly deter them from marriage.5  Divorced persons and 
widowers are either single or cohabiters in this framework.  Married persons are those 
who report ‘married, spouse present’ as their marital status.  Separated individuals report 
either ‘married, spouse absent’ or ‘separated’.  The CPS defines ‘separated’ in such a way 
that it includes those who are legally separated with those who simply have intent to 
become legally separated or divorced.  I assume no person in this category has legally 
changed his or her marital status.   
 Clearly, these definitions are not without problems, but at this stage, I believe they 
are reasonable.  Next, I restrict my analysis to persons between 18 and 64 years of age.6  
Due to the sheer size of the remaining sample and the incumbent computational 
difficulties, I work with a ten percent random sample of 72,019 individuals.   
 I want to consider each pair of individuals as an observation since the marry and 
alone decisions are choices made by a couple or potential couple.  Thus, I use only one 
individual from each pair in my analysis.  I cannot simply look at all females or all males 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Another possible model is the nested logit.  It is theoretically unclear, however, in which order to do the 
nesting.  Do couples decide to marry and then to live alone?  Or, to live alone and then to marry? 
5 If a time comes when marriage or civil-unions are legalized for homosexual couples, it would be 
important and interesting to include them. 
 18 
because that would change the proportion of households that are alone.  Since 62% of 
single and separated individuals are female in my data, examining only women overstates 
the percentage of pairs that live alone.  Likewise, including only men understates the 
proportions that are single or separated.  If this number was 50%, then considering only 
one gender would work.  I use the household head from each pair in my analysis, where 
the household head is identified as such by the CPS.   
 Table 1.2 contains descriptive statistics for the household heads.  Those who 
cohabit are youngest.  Separated individuals have the least amount of education and are 
most likely to be not white.  Married and separated couples have more children than their 
unmarried counterparts.  Single and separated persons are more likely to reside in an 
MSA.  Own earnings are greatest for married persons, while separated individuals have 
the least earnings.  This is due to the way I have divided the data.  Household heads tend 
to be male, and women earn less than men in my data.  In fact, 84% of couples that are 
married or cohabit have a male head of household.  When considering total earnings, 
married couples still have the most income, but cohabiters earn the least. 
 Next, I construct an indicator of the “partnership market”.  This variable is used in 
Z  as a proxy for the ease of finding a suitable partner.  I use Lichter et al’s (1992) ratio 
of marriageable men to women by age and race categories for each state.  Marriageable 
men are all men that are either in school or in the labor force.7  The partnerable men ratio 
(PMR) is then, 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 The very old may have incentives not to marry if, for instance, they receive monetary benefits from 
having a deceased spouse. 
























where ,a rm  is the number of marriageable men of age a  within a given race in a state, 
and ,a rf  is the total number of females of age a  and race r  in the state.  They base this 
ratio on evidence that men tend to marry women who range from two years younger to 
seven year older than their own age.  Conversely, they find women tend to marry men 
between their own age and nine years older.  Table 1.2 indicates that the PMR is slightly 
larger for household heads who cohabit or are married.  Thus, when the ratio of 
partnerable men to women increases, these individuals are more likely to live with 
another person.     
5.1  TAX COST OF MARRIAGE 
After categorizing each individual, I must determine the tax cost of marriage.  I do 
this slightly differently for each group, due to various data limitations.  The tax cost of 
marriage is the difference between tax liability when married and the tax liability when 
not married.  To calculate the requisite tax liabilities, I use the NBER’s TAXSIM model.8 
Due to data limitations, each group of individuals requires different assumptions and 
necessary imputations.  I describe the procedure for each group separately. 
In order to calculate the tax liability while married, I need to know the amount of 
earned and unearned income for each partner and the total number of children or 
dependents.  This calculation is straightforward for cohabiters and married couples, but 
                                                 
8 The NBER provides use of the TAXSIM to the public at www.nber.com/taxsim. Feenberg and Coutts 
(1993) provide an introduction to the use this model. 
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alone individuals pose a problem in that their potential partner is not observed (and 
spousal earnings are crucial to the calculation of the married tax liability).  I estimate an 
equation for spousal earnings for the not alone couples, and use the resulting parameters 
to predict what income the alone person’s potential spouse might have.  Alm and 
Whittington (1999) perform similar imputations for single individuals.  Thus, for the pool 
of married couples and cohabiters, I estimate the earnings of the partner of person i  
according to:   
2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
10 11 .
i i i i i i i
i i i
i i i
partnerearnings a a educ a educ a exper a exper a msa a notwhite
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Note that the independent variables depend only on person i , and not on person i's 
potential partner.  In this equation, educ is the persons education in years, exper is 
potential years of work experience defined as age less education less 6.  Dummy 
variables indicate if the individual resides in an MSA or is not white.  The earnings of 
person are contained in ownearnings. I estimate this equation separately for males and 
females.9  Identification is achieved because the statewide macroeconomic variables that 
may affect the partner’s income are excluded from the alone and marry equations, and 
are not thought to influence either of those choices.  These variables are the statewide 
average wage and unemployment rate and the federal minimum wage, each obtained 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The estimated parameters are then applied to each 
alone person to predict what their potential partner would earn.  Once the partner’s 
                                                 
9 The results from this procedure are contained in Appendix 1A.    
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earnings are imputed, it is straightforward to calculate the tax liability while married for 
not alone people as well.  
 Next I must calculate the tax liability while not married for every individual.  I 
assume each person retains his or her own reported unearned income.  Persons who 
reside alone file either as head of household if any children are present, or as single if 
none are present.  For married couples, I must make assumptions about who receives 
custody of the children.  I do this two different ways.  First I allow the woman to retain 
custody of any children and file as head of household, while the male would file as single 
( )WT .  I also calculate tax liability where the primary earner receives custody of any 
children ( )PET .  Couples who cohabit retain their own biological children.  If they have 
children together, then custody is given to either the woman or the primary earner as for 
married couples.  If there are no children present, both partners in a not alone couple file 
as single when not married.   
 Finally, I can calculate the marriage tax.  Let MT  be tax liability while married, 
i
W




NMT  be the tax where the primary earner retains custody.  The subscripts i  
and j  index each individual and their partner.  (Note that 
i
W
NMT  and i
PE
NMT  are equivalent 
for single and separated individuals and cohabiters.)  Then, let the tax cost of marriage 




i M NM NMT T T T= − −  (1.14) 
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assuming that the woman gets custody.  Likewise, let the tax cost of marriage for 




i M NM NMT T T T= − −  (1.15) 
for the case where the primary earner receives custody.   
For alone persons, these two definitions of the marriage tax are difficult to 
compute.  Each requires a calculation of the unmarried tax liability for the potential 
partner in addition to the person in question.  I compute the tax liability of these 
hypothetical persons in the same manner as for single and separated outlined above 
treating the imputed partner’s earnings as the hypothetical partners own earnings.  I have 
no measure of the potential partner’s unearned income, and simply assume it equals zero 
at this time.  Thus, these two marriage tax definitions may not be precise for single and 
separated individuals, though the results are not biased by a meaningful amount.10   
To see this, note that unearned income affects both MT  and NMT  for the potential 
partner.  Thus, both tax liabilities will change if I let the partner’s unearned income equal 
some nonzero amount:  either the average of the sample, or an imputed value, or some 
other construct.  Since the tax rate for a married couple is greater than or equal to the 
unmarried tax rate, the marriage tax could be a larger amount for alone persons if the 
potential partner’s unearned income is not 0.  For example, let j  represent the potential 
partner of a single individual i  and let each individual have mean earnings and assume 
                                                 
10 To circumvent these difficulties, I also define the marriage tax another way that is consistent across all 
four categories:  TWHi = ½ TM - T
W
NMi  and  T
PEH
i = ½ TM – T
PE
NMi.  In these calculations, the marriage tax is 
equal to one half the tax liability while married less the particular individual’s unmarried tax liability.  
However, these measures implicitly assign a positive marriage tax to secondary earners (women) and a 
negative tax to primary earners (men) which implies that the tax affects their decision to marry differently.  
Yet, the choice to marry is one made by a couple, and not by an individual. 
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person i has unearned income of $500.  Furthermore, assume there are no children and it 
is 1999 in Alabama.  Using TAXSIM and assuming 0 unearned income for the potential 
partner, 3802 1584 2008 210WiT = − − = .  Now let the potential partner’s unearned 
income be $500 as well.  The marriage tax becomes 3877 1584 2085 210WiT = − − = , 
which is exactly the same as before.  This result should hold as long as the unearned 
income does not cause the couple to face a larger tax rate while married than when single.  
In my data, the mean amount of unearned income for a single person is only $141.28.  
Thus, assuming the potential partner has no unearned income is not expected to affect the 
results for the average ind ividual.   
The average tax rates for the four alternatives are contained in Table 1.2.  If the 
tax cost is a disincentive to marriage, then married and separated individuals are expected 
to experience a smaller marriage tax than those who are single or cohabit.  For WT , this is 
precisely what occurs.  Single individuals would pay an average of $87.98 per year more 
in taxes if they married, while separated individuals only pay an additional $3.18.  
Likewise, married couples tend to receive a subsidy of $194.06 while couples who 
cohabit would pay $184.20 more if they married.  The primary earner receiving the kids, 
PET , is a tax-minimizing divorce strategy and so this measure yields a larger marriage 
tax.  For example, married couples face a marriage tax that is about $25 more than 
couples who cohabit when the tax is computed this way.  However, 38% of alone women 
in my data have children in the household whereas only 8.7% of alone men have 
children, and primary earners are less likely to have children than secondary earners.  
 24 
Thus WT  may represent more accurately than PET  the way couples think about the tax 
cost of marriage. 
Figure 1.2 contains a graph of the average value of WT  between 1989 and 1999, 
for each of the four alternatives.  During this time period, the average amount of the tax 
trends upwards.  Couples who cohabit always face a greater tax cost than married 
couples, on average.  For instance in 1994 the average annual tax cost for a couple who 
cohabits is $71.95, while it is -$199.90 for a married couple.  Single individuals pay a 
greater marriage tax than separated individuals prior to 1997 in my data.   
6.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
I first estimate equation (1.10) via maximum likelihood for household heads.  
Coefficients from this procedure are contained in Table 1.3.  Although the magnitudes 
are not meaningful, the signs of the variables point in the expected directions.  In 
addition, all variables are significant at a 99% level of confidence with the exception of 
the terms for age and education in the alone equation.  The likelihood an individual 
chooses marry decreases if that person is not white or lives in an MSA, and increases 
with the presence of children and age.  The probability of living alone decreases with 
own earnings, education, the partnerable men ratio and the presence and number of 
children.  Household heads are more likely to live alone if they are not white or live in an 
MSA.  The parameter of interest, the marriage tax, has a negative effect on marry.  The 
estimated correlation coefficient is -.918, indicating that these two choices are correlated 
highly. 
Table 1.4 contains the corresponding marginal effects for each of the four 
alternatives evaluated at the means.  All effects have the expected signs.  The marginal 
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effect of the tax on the probability of being married is small in magnitude, -1.18e-06, and 
significant at the 95% level of confidence.  With a mean tax of -$77.18 and 63.03% of 
household heads predicted to be married, the implied elasticity is 0.00014.  Thus 
doubling the marriage tax would change the proportion of married couples by .01 
percent.   
Next, I perform various checks for robustness and specification in Table 1.5.  The 
previous results are replicated in the first row designated base case.  Next, I add in fixed 
effects for states and years.  State variables are important if people in different parts of 
the country have differing attitudes toward marriage, while the year variables capture 
unobserved changes in societal behavior over time.  Neither state nor year variables 
change the base results by a significant amount.   
I replace own and partner earnings with total earnings in my next specification check 
since much of the earlier literature uses total household earnings as a determinant of 
marriage.  It is apparent from Tables 1.3 and 1.4 that own earnings and partner earnings 
affect the likelihood of marriage in opposing directions.  For household heads, own 
earnings decrease the likelihood of living alone, presumably because higher earnings 
make them a better “catch” in the eyes of a potential partner. The partner’s earnings are 
generally smaller than own earnings because I am looking at household heads, and this 
causes partner earnings to increase the likelihood of living alone.  Rather, this result 
simply reflects the fact that household heads that are married or cohabit have partners 
with smaller earnings than individuals who are single or separated.  The point is that total 
earnings incorporate both own and partner earnings and are expected to have a smaller 
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effect on the likelihood function.  In fact, the new marginal effects of the marriage tax 
when using total earnings are almost half as large in magnitude as the base case. 
In the next row, I use PET  as the measure of the marriage tax. This leads to an even 
smaller effect on the likelihood of marriage.  With a mean tax of $161.09 and 63.03% of 
households predicted to be married, the implied elasticity is 0.00027.  However, since 
separated women are more likely to have children than separated men in my data, TW 
reflects custody decisions more accurately.    
6.1  COMPARISON WITH CHOICE MODELS HAVING ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES 
 My estimates of the marginal effects are smaller than those of previous works.  
The major difference in the estimation procedure is that I incorporate all four potential 
alternatives, whereas others consider only two possible alternatives at a time.  The 
influence of the marriage tax is smaller for every specification used here.  This result is 
also invariant to the method used to calculate the marriage tax.  Thus, previous estimates 
may suffer an omitted variable bias that overstates the size of the effect.  However, I use 
different data, and years, and measure of the marriage tax, so direct comparison is 
impossible. 
 To compare my results to those that only consider two alternatives, I estimate a 
basic probit with marry as the dependent variable.  As in the previous literature, I include 
all of the covariates from both the previous alone and marry equations in the base case 
into this regression.  Table 1.6 contains these estimates.  For household heads, the 
estimated marginal effect of WT  on the likelihood of marriage is -6.29e-06 evaluated at 
the means.  This model predicts 68.7 percent of household heads are married, which 
yields an estimated tax-price elasticity of marriage of 0.0007.  This is much larger than 
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the estimated 0.00014 elasticity in the base case.  Furthermore, the marginal effects are 
more than twice as large in magnitude as in the results that include all four alternatives.  I 
also examine the choice to marry for household heads who currently are either married or 
cohabit.  This yields an estimated marginal effect of -9.85e-06.  With a mean tax rate that 
equals -$166.41 and 96.6% of households predicted to marry, the estimated tax-price 
elasticity is 0.0017.  Taken together, my results indicate that studies that do not include 
all four possible outcomes can overstate by as much as 200% the effect of the marriage 
tax on the likelihood of marriage.   
6.2  SIMULATIONS  
 I use results from the base case to simulate how the marriage tax affects 
individuals with various demographic characteristics.  Table 1.7 examines how the 
marriage tax influences household formation decisions by age, race, and number of 
children.  All calculations assume that the individual is a high school graduate with mean 
earnings and mean tax cost of marriage.    Age, race, and number of children are at the 
levels indicated on the table.   The remaining two variables, the partnerable men ratio and 
MSA dummy, are each set equal to the mean values.   
 In all cases, the probability of marriage and separation increases with age, while 
the likelihoods of single and cohabit decrease.  Likewise, the elasticity of marriage with 
respect to the tax decreases with age.  The youngest are about three times as sensitive to 
the marriage tax as older individuals, all else equal.  White individuals are much more 
likely to marry than not white (76% versus 63% for an individual who is 35 years old 
with 1 child).  Finally, having 1 child more than doubles the likelihood of marriage for 
the youngest individuals, and nearly doubles it for the oldest.   
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 Next, I examine how the predicted outcomes change with the level of the 
marriage tax, all else equal.  Table 1.8 contains predicted probabilities for each 
alternative by quartile of the marriage tax for a hypothetical white 35 year old with one 
child and a high school education.  The predicted likelihood of marriage ranges from 
77% in the bottom quartile to 70% in the top quartile.  The estimated probabilities for 
single and separated both increase with the tax.  Cohabitation is the only outcome that 
does not change with different levels of the tax perhaps indicating that couples who 
choose to cohabit are not sensitive to the marriage tax.  This table illustrates how a 
decrease in the marriage tax can increase the likelihood of marriage. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The purpose of my analysis is to determine the effect of the so-called marriage tax 
on the decision to marry.  Previous studies only compare marriage to one other 
alternative.  For instance, some of these papers compare married and cohabiting couples, 
while others compare married couples and separated individuals, or married couples and 
unmarried individuals.  I incorporate into one cohesive model all four alternatives (single, 
cohabit, married, separated).   
Using data from the March CPS from 1989-1999, I then estimate this model for 
household heads.  My results show that estimates of the likelihood of marriage are 
sensitive to the method used to calculate the marriage tax.  When I assume the wife gets 
the children the marginal effect is -1.18e-06, while the effect decreases in magnitude to -
1.57e-06 when the primary earner retains custody.  I find a tax-price elasticity of 
marriage equal to 0.00014 when the woman is assumed to receive custody of any 
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children evaluated at the means.  This is one quarter the size of the elasticity I find when 
considering only two alternatives as in the previous literature: marry or not marry.   
The potential endogeneity between the marriage tax and the earnings of the 
secondary earner could pose problems for estimating equation (1.10).   If couples marry 
to minimize tax liability, then married couples will tend to have similar incomes, while 
couples who cohabit will have dissimilar earnings.  My model assumes that couples who 
cohabit pool their incomes and allocate household resources the same way as married 
couples.  This is a strong assumption.  If cohabiters do not pool income, my results could 
overstate the proportion of couples who cohabit, and understate single and separated.  In 
fact, when I use total earnings instead of separating own and partner earnings as a proxy 
for household economies of scale the predicted likelihood of cohabit does decrease from 
4.87% in the base case to 4.48% while single and separated each increase.  However, this 
change is small enough that I do not think it affects my main conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2.  COMPOSITION OF CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the War Revenue Act of 1917, the federal government has allowed some 
taxpayers to deduct contributions to charitable organizations from their income when 
calculating federal income tax liability.  The deduction was included in this act to pacify 
fears that newly taxed individuals with high- income would cease their donations to 
institutions of higher learning.  The tax act allowed deductions for “contributions or gifts 
actually made within the year to corporations or associations organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educations purposes, or to societies for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,”(Aprill 2001).  Congress, in 1944, 
extended the income tax to include more individuals, not just the very wealthy.  In fact 
the percentage of individuals subject to the income tax increased from 5 to 74 percent.  
At this time the standard deduction was introduced and much debate centered on whether 
non- itemizers should be allowed to deduct their charitable contributions.  Proponents of 
the standard deduction argued that the average charitable contribution of two and half 
percent was taken into account in setting the standard deduction. The opponents argued 
that donations to charity provide a public good, and should be tax exempt to encourage 
contributions to institutions that benefit society.   
Over time the definition of a charity has evolved to include any organization that 
defines its purpose as religious, educational, literary, scientific, prevention of cruelty to 
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children or animals as well as fraternal societies and veterans’ associations 1.  Clearly, 
some of these organizations benefit the poor more than others.  The purpose of this 
analysis is to see what types of organizations individuals donate to, and in turn if the 
deduction influences individuals to donate to organizations that benefit the needy more or 
less than other charitable organizations.   
This has important policy implications.  Only those taxpayers with total itemized 
deductions greater than the standard deduction can deduct their charitable contributions.2  
Itemizers tend to be wealthier than non- itemizers because a large component of 
itemization comes from mortgage interest and property taxes, and homeownership is 
positively correlated with income and wealth.  If the higher income taxpayers who 
itemize choose to donate to organizations that benefit the needy, then the income tax 
deduction is, in essence, a form of government subsidized income redistribution.  On the 
other hand, if itemizers donate to charities that provide services that benefit themselves 
and not the poor, the government is essentially subsidizing the activities of the rich.   
I first present a simple theoretical framework of warm-glow giving.  The model 
illustrates how a donor may give more to one particular charity if it makes them feel 
better to do so, or if it provides a larger warm-glow.  I make no assumption about why the 
warm-glow is larger for one charity than another.  It may be the case that these donors 
wish to see their donations serve the needy.  In this case, an organization that benefits the 
needy produces a larger warm-glow than one that does not benefit the needy.  Likewise, 
donors may prefer giving to organizations that provide services that they use.  Either way, 
                                                 
1 See IRS Publication 526, “Charitable Contributions”. 
2 The exception is in 1986 when all taxpayers were allowed to deduct charitable gifts in addition to the 
standard deduction. 
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this framework allows individuals to choose which charity to donate to based on how it 
makes them feel.  Whether donors receive a larger warm-glow giving to organizations 
that benefit the needy or not, is an empirical question. 
Previous works estimate the tax-price elasticity for charitable contributions in 
order to address whether the deduction influences donation behavior.3  They also 
examine demographic characteristics of the donors.  No one, however, has asked if the 
donations go to organizations that aid the needy.   
To answer this question, I need micro data on individual giving to specific types 
of organizations as well as a measure of whether and how the various non-profits use 
their funds to help the poor.  The first type of data is not difficult to acquire.  I use the 
Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) module in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) in 2001 and 2003.  This survey contains data on giving for 11 different 
categories of charitable organizations.  The last major study with as much detail was 
performed in 1974, the National Study of Philanthropy.  In addition to being timelier, the 
PSID has better income data, which are necessary to compute marginal tax rates.   
Using results from existing literature, I develop an index for each of the 11 
categories of non-profits that indicates what percentage of total expenditures benefits the 
needy.  Then I use this ratio to see if individuals give more to organizations that benefit 
the poor.  Furthermore, I test if giving to organizations that benefit the needy varies with 
income.  My results indicate that the tax deduction causes donors to behave altruistically.  
While wealth itemizers donate the largest amounts to the arts and education, I find 
evidence that the tax deduction causes them to increase their donations to organizations 
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that benefit the poor.  Any price decrease (tax increase) is predicted to cause the largest 
increases in giving to organizations that benefit the poor.  I perform several policy 
simulations that change the tax treatment of donations.  In all cases, the largest percent 
changes in giving are in donations to the poor. 
2.  THEORETICAL MODEL OF WARM-GLOW GIVING 
 The basic model of individual giving to public goods first developed by Gary 
Becker in 1976 gives each individual a utility function over both a private good and a 
public good.  Individuals maximize utility subject to the constraint that income equals 
spending on the private good and donations to the public good.  This model of public 
goods accounts for giving motivated by altruism, and ignores the fact that individuals 
may gain satisfaction from the act of giving.  Over time, the preferred model has evolved 
into one that allows individuals to receive a “warm-glow” from giving (Andreoni 1989, 
1990).  The warm-glow model recognizes that the act of giving to a charity may provide 
positive utility to the donor.  Individual utility can be represented by  
 ( , , )i i iU U x G g=  (2.1) 
where ix is the private good, ig is the amount donated to charity, and iG g= ∑ is the total 
amount of public good provided by the charity.  The addition of the donated amount into 
the utility function captures the warm-glow that the individual receives from the act of 
donating, while the second term reflects the utility the individual gets from the presence 
of or use of the public good. If im  represents individual income, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
3. Notable works include Feldstein (1976), Randolph (1995), and Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002).  






= ∑ represents all other individual donations, the individual’s problem can be 
expressed as: 
 max  ( , , )  s.t.  i i i i iU x G G G x G G m−− + − = . (2.2) 
Andreoni (1990, 2005) shows that at Nash equilibrium, assuming all individuals are 
identical, * ( , )i i i i i ig f m G G G− − −= + − .   
 To illustrate this, consider a Cobb-Douglas utility function so that  
 ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i i iU x G gα β= + + . (2.3) 
The warm-glow the individual receives from a donation is represented by β , while α  
characterizes the utility enjoyed from the public good created by the charity.  At the Nash 











Thus an individual’s donation to the charity is a function of his or her own income, the 
utility received from the public good, the warm-glow received from the donation, and the 
total number of people. 
 As a more interesting scenario, consider a world with two charities that provide 
two distinct public goods.  One charity provides a good that traditionally benefits the 
poor ( LG ) and the other provides a good that tends to benefit the wealthy ( HG ).  For 
instance, LG  could be a soup kitchen while HG  is an art museum.  Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas utility function, individual utility is: 
 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i i L L L Li H H H HiU x G g G gα β α β= + + + +  (2.5) 
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Notice that the warm-glow may not be the same for donations to the two charities if 
L Hβ β≠ .  Likewise, when H Lα α≠ , the public goods provide different amounts of utility 
to the individual.  Let it  denote the marginal tax rate for individual i , so that the price of 
giving is 1 it−  if the individual can itemize their contributions.  Then, the budget 
constraint for each individual is (1 )( )i i i Li Him x t g g= − − + .   
Suppose that there are two types of individuals:  rich (R) and poor (P).  Rich 
individuals use and benefit from HG , while poor individuals use and benefit from LG .  If 
the poor make no donations, so that * 0LPg =  and 
* 0HPg = , then at the Nash equilibrium 
* *
L R LRG n g=  , 
* *
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Notice that the denominators for the two donation amounts are the same.  Thus, 





β β+ > + .  Several interesting scenarios can occur.  Suppose that the donor 
receives no warm-glow from donations to the soup kitchen ( 0LRβ = ), and that donations 
to the art museum produce a positive warm-glow ( 0HRβ > ).  Then the rich individual 
gives more to the art museum than to the soup kitchen as long as HR LRHR
R Rn n
α α
β+ > .  
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Conversely, the donation to the soup kitchen will be larger if the utility from the presence 
of the soup kitchen divided by the total number of donors is greater than the combined 
utility of the art museum and the warm-glow from giving to the museum.  If the two 
goods provide equal utility LR HRα α= , individuals give to whichever good makes them 
feel better about their gift, or whichever has the larger β .   
Now suppose that both types of individuals make donations.  Each type 
maximizes utility according to (2.5).  At the Nash equilibrium * * *L R LR P LPG n g n g= + and 
* * *
H R HR P HPG n g n g= +  where Rn  denotes the number of high- income individuals and Pn  
represents the number of low-income individuals.  The first under conditions require that: 
1
0R LR LR HR HR
R LR HR R LR P LP LR R HR P HP HR
t
m g g n g n g g n g n g g
α β α β−
= + = + =
− − + +
, and  (2.8) 
1
0P LP LP HP HP
P LP HP R LR P LP LP R HR P HP HP
t
m g g n g n g g n g n g g
α β α β−
= + = + =
− − + +
 (2.9) 
 
The equilibrium solution is difficult to solve because donations by the rich are dependent 
on the level of donations by the poor, and vice versa.  Instead, I consider two special 
separating cases that illustrate what can occur at the extremes.   
First, consider the case of “pure egoism”.  In this case, each type of donor only 
donates to the charity that they benefit from and/or use.  This means that the poor give 
nothing to HG , 
* 0HPg = , and the rich donate nothing to LG , 
* 0LRg = .  Note that this 
implies that 0LRβ =  and 0HPβ = , or donors receive no warm-glow from the charities 
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   (2.10) 
In this separating outcome, the donation by one type of individual is independent of the 
preferences of the other type of individual. 
             Next, consider the case of “pure altruism”.  Each type of individual gives only to 
the charity that they do not use or benefit from.  The poor give nothing to the soup 
kitchen, * 0LPg = , and the rich give nothing to the art museum, 
* 0HRg = .  This implies that 
the poor receive no warm-glow from the soup kitchen and the rich receive no warm-glow 
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 Clearly this is an over simplistic representation of the problem, but it illustrates 
the basic motivation of my research.  Since charities provide different public goods, two 
potential donors may choose to donate to different charities if they receive different 
levels of satisfaction, or warm-glow, from those donations.  Both charities provide public 
goods, so why does it matter who funds each charity?  The answer is the income tax 
deduction for charitable contributions, which is taken primarily by those with higher 
incomes.  If high- income individuals choose to give more to charities that provide goods 
that they directly use or benefit from, the government is essentially subsidizing their 
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activities.  On the other hand, high- income individuals may donate to charities that 
benefit the needy and the tax deduction results in a form of income redistribution.   
In my empirics, I differentiate between types of charities by how much they 
benefit the poor.  The truly altruistic individual gets more utility from the public good 
provided by the charities that help the poor ( L Hα α> ) and possibly even a larger warm-
glow ( L Hβ β> ).  Of course, the purely self- interested individual may have L Hβ β<  and 
L Hα α< .  This is empirically testable.  Rather, I can test if those with higher income give 
to charities that help the poor or to charities that benefit the rich.   
3.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
Many previous works that estimate the price elasticity of giving include Reece 
(1979), Feldstein (1975), Randolph (1995), and Auten et al (2002).  The basic 
specification is a log- log form like the following:  
 ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i p i y i i ig P Y Xβ β β ε= + + +  (2.12) 
where ig  represents total individual donations, iY  denotes income, and Xi  is a matrix of 
relevant demographic characteristics.  The price of giving is one dollar for non- itemizers, 
and one minus the marginal tax rate, 1i iP t= −  , for itemizers.  Then pβ  and yβ  are the 
price and income elasticities of giving, respectively.  Notice that the gifts made by other 
individuals do not enter (2.12).  Andreoni and Scholz (1998) test this exclusion and find 
that gifts made by an individual are not dependent on the gifts of others at the margin. 
The previous literature contains two different measures of the marginal tax rate.  
First, the donor’s actual marginal tax rate is the incentive at the margin to give one more 
dollar, but it is determined in part by the total amount given and is therefore endogenous.  
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For this reason, researches calculate the “first dollar” tax rate as the marginal tax rate for 
the first dollar donated to charity.  That is, the tax rate is computed as if no dona tions are 
made to charity.  Since the “first dollar” measure of price is presumably uncorrelated 
with the after tax level of giving, many researchers use this tax to correct for the  
endogeneity problem.  Others use the last dollar price and instrument for it using the first 
dollar price.  I use the first dollar price.   
Two separate income measures are used in the literature:  gross income and after-
tax income.  Any measure of after-tax income must be adjusted to the level it would be if 
giving were zero since after-tax income depends on the level of charitable giving.  I use 
total pre-tax income, since it is less likely to suffer the endogeneity problems of after-tax 
income and more likely to be independent of any other tax avoidance decisions.     
Since many families donate nothing to charity, 0ig = , equation (2.12) is 
estimated via a Tobit model, which accounts for the common corner solution.  
Furthermore since log(0)  is undefined, I use the usual solution of adding $10 to both ig  
and iy .   
I want to determine if the deduction for charitable contributions influences 
whether or not individuals give to organizations that benefit the poor.  Let jI be the index 
measure of how well charities of type j benefit the needy.  An index value of 1 means that 
type of charity spends 100% of its resources on the needy; while a value of 0 means that 





= ∑ denote a measure of total 
gifts to the needy by individual i.   Then I can estimate 
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i p i y i iGN P Y Xβ β β ε= + + +    (2.13) 
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to find the price and income elasticities of giving to charitable organizations that benefit 
the poor.  I also estimate separate versions of (2.12) for each category of charity, where 
the dependent variable is total donations to that category.   
 In order to determine if giving to the needy varies with income, I add splines in 
income and price.  This allows the slopes of the elasticities to change at specified points.   
I compare income and price elasticities across categories and income groups in 
order to test if individuals are altruistic or egoists.  For example, suppose one category is 
called Soup Kitchen and has an income elasticity of 0.3 and another category for Arts has 
an income elasticity of 0.5.  Then a 10% increase in income causes a 50% increase in 
giving to the Arts, and a 30% increase in giving to Soup Kitchens.  If the elasticity 
estimates are for a rich individual, they provide evidence of egoism.  They give more, at 
the margin, to organizations that benefit themselves.  Conversely, if the elasticity 
estimates are for a poor individual, the results imply altruism.  They give more to 
organizations that benefit others.4  I also look at total giving to a type of charity within an 
income group under several policy reforms to see if that sheds any more light on how the 
tax deduction is related to giving behavior. 
This analysis does not take account the dynamic nature of income and giving.  
Recent works by Randolph (1995) and Auten et al (2002) allow for both permanent and 
transitory income and prices.  They find that total giving is much more responsive to 
permanent income than to transitory income, and is more responsive to transitory price 
than to permanent price.  Since I only examine two years of data, my analysis ignores the 
                                                 
4 This methodology implicitly assumes that donations to different types of charities are decided upon 
independently.  If, on the other hand, individuals choose the total amount to give and then allocate that 
amount between various charities, the problems of seemingly unrelated regressions are relevant.   
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dynamic nature of giving behavior.  I am more interested in comparisons across types of 
charities than in the actual magnitude of the estimates.  As long as the permanent and 
transitory responses differ across charity categories in the same manner as my static 
responses, the omission of the dynamic aspect of the problem does not affect the results. 
4.  DATA ON GIVING DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICS 
 I utilize a module from the 2001 and 2003 PSID called the Center on Philanthropy 
Panel Study (COPPS).  One possible concern is that the PSID over samples low-income 
households.  This could be problematic if higher income individuals give to charity in a 
different manner than low-income households.  Wilhelm (2002) compared this study to 
the 1974 National Study of Philanthropy, which over-sampled the rich, and determined 
that the two surveys found comparable results.   
The PSID contains 16,621 pooled observations of families in 2001 and 2003.  I 
exclude the self-employed and farmers (887 observations) as well as families where the 
head is older than 64 (2119 observations) leaving me with 13,615 observations.  The self-
employed and farmers face special tax rules, making it difficult to compute their marginal 
tax rates.  Individuals over age 64 may have retired and have current income lower than 
their permanent income.  Estimates of the ir income elasticity will be biased downwards if 
the giving behavior of these families does not decrease upon retirement.   
Table 2.1 contains weighted descriptive statistics for the remaining sample of 
13,615.  Sixty-four percent of these families donate some amount of money to a 
charitable organization.  Forty-three percent itemized deductions, and 30% itemized 
charitable contributions.  Not all donors itemize.  Only 57% of families who gave to a 
charity reported itemizing a charitable contribution on their tax return.  For itemizers, 
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88% give to charity, while only 47% of non- itemizers donate.  This suggests that 
itemization and the tax deductibility of donations play a role in giving decisions.  The 
mean income is $64,658.  The first set of variables contains controls used in studies that 
utilize tax data:  age of head, whether married, and number of kids.  These are the only 
demographic variables in such data.  One advantage of the PSID is that it has lots of other 
information.  I include three additional demographic variables:  education of head, male, 
and white.  Next, I include dummy variables for religious affiliation.  Ten percent report 
no religious affiliation, 34% are Protestant, 17% are Catholic, 2% are Jewish, and 37% 
report some other affiliation.  The next variable, own, equals 1 if the family owns their 
home and 0 otherwise.  Homeowners may have more attachment to their community, and 
may be more likely to donate to charitable organizations in the community.  The final 
variable, emergency food, equals 1 if the family received emergency food in the last year.  
This is a proxy to control for families that may receive benefits from charitable 
organizations.  I expect these families to be less likely to donate, on average, than 
otherwise similar families.   
Another benefit of using the PSID is that it contains extensive income data for 
each family.  This enables me to use the NBER’s TAXSIM calculator to compute 
marginal tax rates for each family.  As explained in the preceding section, I compute the 
marginal tax rate for the first dollar of contributions made to charity.  In addition, each 
family is asked if they itemized deductions on their taxes.  Earlier surveys do not contain 
this information, and researchers who used them have to determine itemization status 
using the available income data.  The mean federal + state marginal tax rate is 22.3%, 
while the mean price is 0.88.  For donors, the mean price is 0.83, while the mean price for 
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non-donors is 0.965.  Conditional on itemizing, the mean price is 0.72.  Since donors 
have a smaller price (larger tax rate) than non-donors, it seems that the price (tax rate) 
matters for donation decisions. 
 Table 2.2 shows the breakdown in giving by each category. 5  The top panel 
contains nine rows categories that are included in both years of the survey.  The five 
categories in the bottom panel contain information for 2003 only.  Column 1 contains the 
mean contribution for each category conditional on giving to that specific type of 
organization for all donors, and column 2 represents the number of families giving to 
each category.  The next three pairs of columns subdivide giving behavior into income 
groups.  For nearly all categories, giving increases with income.  Not surprisingly, 72% 
of donors report giving something to a religious organization.  Outside of religion, the 
two most popular categories of charities are organizations that serve a combination of 
purposes (Combo) (i.e. United Way and Catholic Charities) and those that help the needy 
through food or shelter (Needy).  The least popular categories seem to be those that 
improve neighborhoods and communities (Community), Environmental causes, and 
International Aid and World Peace agencies.   
4.1 INDEX VALUES 
 I use results from existing literature to determine the index values for each 
category of charity.  For most of the categories, I use results from a book edited by 
Charles Clotfelter entitled “Who Benefits from the Non-Profit Sector?”  Each chapter in 
this book answers the title question for a different category including:  health services, 
                                                 
5 For more information about what each category contains, see Appendix 2B. 
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education, religious organizations, social services, arts and culture, and foundations.  The 
‘who’ that benefits in the title refers to the income classification of the recipients.   
 In general, each index value is the percent of recipients or users of the charity 
with low income multiplied by the percent of income spent on recipients (as opposed to 
fundraising or administrative costs).  Each index is between 0 and 1, where 1 means they 
give 100% of their funds or services to the poor, and 0 indicates that they give 100% to 
the non-poor.   Appendix 2A describes exactly what information I use to calculate each 
value.  Table 2.3 summarizes the calculated index values.  The magnitudes are not 
important.  Rather, what matters is the size of each category’s index relative to those of 
other categories.  As expected, Arts have the smallest index value (.139), while the Social 
Services category has the largest index value (.498).6  Certainly, the reader may have 
their own perceptions about how well each category benefits the poor, and I do not claim 
that these values are the “best” measures.  I present these results as one way to quantify 
the benefits, which is helpful later to compare the regression results across categories. 
Table 2.2 provides evidence that income is correlated with giving.  Taking into 
account the indices of Table 2.3, it also illustrates that some of the largest gifts, on 
average, are to groups that traditionally benefit the poor (Combo, Needy, Social 
Services).  However, this information tells us nothing about how these donations are 
related to the tax deduction.  It would be an easy mistake to say that the largest donations 
are to groups that help the poor, so people must be altruistic.  What matters is how these 
donations change at the margin, while controlling for other variables.  It may be the case 
                                                 
6 The Social Services category does not correlate directly with any one category of giving in the PSID.  It is 
a combination of Needy, Youth, and Community.  Thus, I create a giving category called Social Services = 
Needy + Youth + Community to use for the regression analyses. 
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that the rich have a larger income elasticity for giving to Needy than they do for Arts.  If 
this is so, then I can call them altruistic.  However, if the effect goes the other direction, it 
might be evidence of egoism. 
5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 Table 2.4 contains results for estimates of (2.12) via Tobit where the dependent 
variable is the natural log of total donations.  The reported results here and throughout 
this chapter are marginal effects conditional on 0ig > .  In column (1), I use only the 
additional variables that are dominant in the literature:  age of head, married, number of 
kids, and a year dummy.  This yields a price elasticity of -2.26 and an income elasticity of 
0.627.  In columns (2)-(5), I successively add in more groups of variables:  
demographics, religion, community attachment, and state fixed effects.  In all 
specifications, standard errors are clustered by families.  Notice that the addition of state 
fixed effects in column (5) does not affect the price and income elasticity estimates.   
Therefore, all further equations in this chapter omit the state fixed effects.  All of the 
religious variables have a positive sign, indicating that religious families donate more 
than similar families with no religious affiliation.  Homeowners give around 25% more 
than renters.  Families that receive emergency food give 37% less than their counterparts, 
controlling for other variables.  The price and income elasticities in column (4) [-1.75 and 
0.46] differ slightly from the estimates in the literature [ -1.3 and 0.7].  My estimates 
include more control variables, utilize more recent data, and contain information on non-
itemizers. 
Next I estimate the specification in column (4) for each category of giving.  Refer 
to table 2.5 for the price and income elasticity estimates.  Total giving is more elastic in 
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both price and income than indexed giving to the poor.  The categories are presented in 
descending order of the index value.  Thus, the social services category is listed first, 
since it has the highest index for helping the poor, and the arts are listed last with the 
lowest index value.  The results by category in this table suggest giving is altruis tic.  At 
the margin, a 10% increase in income increases giving to groups that support the needy 
and groups that provide social services by 2%, while giving to health, education, and arts 
groups increase by 1.6%, 1.8%, and 1.05%.  However, table 2.2 indicates that giving 
patterns vary with income.  Thus, the estimates of the price and income elasticities may 
vary over income. 
Table 2.6 compares the additions of price and income splines to the model for 
total giving.  Column 1 contains the previous result with no splines.  In column 2 I add a 
spline in income.  The price elasticity does not change statistically.  The income splines 
are all significant, and imply that donors in different income categories do have different 
income elasticities.  Donors in the upper third of income are the least income elastic 
(0.125), followed by the poorest third (0.497) and the then the middle third (0.760).  Next 
I examine the effects of a price spline, with no spline in income.  The new income 
elasticity (0.507) is not statis tically different from the original income elasticity of 0.472.  
The price elasticities vary significantly.  The poorest are the most price responsive (-
3.11), and the richest third are the least (-1.525).  Finally, I consider both a price and 
income spline in column 4.  The price elasticities change, but only slightly.  The income 
elasticity for the poor, however, is dramatically different from column 2, the wrong sign, 
and not statistically different from 0.  Columns 3 and 4 indicate that donors in different 
income categories do exhibit different price responsiveness.  The significant spline 
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income elasticities in column 2 with only one price variable are most likely picking up 
the effects of the different price elasticities.  From here on, I use the specification in 
column 3 with a spline in price and no income spline. 
In Table 2.7 I compare the price and income elasticities with a spline in price 
across the types of charities.  As before, the largest income elasticities are for categories 
that benefit the poor:  social services (0.237), needy (0.215), and combo purpose (0.305).  
First consider the price elasticity estimates for families in the upper third of income.  
Excluding the insignificant estimates, the smallest elasticities are for the charities that 
benefit themselves: environment (-0.26), arts (-0.11), education (-0.35), and health (-
0.38).  Meanwhile the price elasticity for giving to charities that benefit the needy is -
0.575.  Thus, the wealthiest tercile is not influenced by the tax in making donations to 
organizations that benefit themselves.  They are, however, twice as price responsive 
when making donations that benefit others.  Also of note, the income elasticity for 
donating to the arts is almost twice as large in absolute value as the education and health 
elasticities for donors in the bottom two income terciles.  Taken together, this table 
implies that the tax deduction is likely to induce donors to give to organizations that they 
do not benefit from.  Charities that the donor benefits from are much more inelastic than 
charities that benefit others.   
The categories with more than 12,600 observations contain information for both 
years.  The remaining 5 categories contain information for 2003 only.  To test that giving 
behavior is not inherently different in 2003, I present Table 2.8 where the sample is 
restricted to 2003 for all categories.  While the magnitudes differ slightly, the exact same 
patterns arise.  Excluding needy and combo purpose organizations, the top and bottom 
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terciles are still more price elastic for categories that tend to benefit others, while the 
middle income tercile may be altruistic.  In Table 2.9, I exploit the panel nature of the 
data and estimate a random effect Tobit for the categories that contain information in 
both years.  Once again, the magnitudes change slightly, but the patterns remain the 
same.  Taken together, all of the results indicate that both the poor and the rich are more 
price and income elastic when donating to charities that benefit others.  Charities that 
benefit themselves are more price inelastic.  Thus, the tax deduction should encourage 
each group to give more to groups that benefit others.  With respect to the tax, both 
groups appear to be altruistic.   
6.  POLICY SIMULATIONS 
The previous sections results demonstrate that donations are responsive to the tax 
price, that the price elasticity differs by type of charity, and that this elasticity is non-
linear in income.  In this section I use the elasticity estimates to simulate what happens to 
aggregate donations and tax revenue under reform.  While similar analyses are performed 
by Feldstein and Taylor (1976) they use tax return data.  Consequently, they must make 
assumptions about the donations of non-itemizers, and the price elasticity’s are computed 
using only data for itemizers.  This could be problematic if non- itemizers react to the tax 
differently from itemizers.  My estimation includes both itemizers and non- itemizers and 
will not have this problem. 












 implies that ln lni ig Pε∆ = ⋅ ∆ .  Let 
'
iP  denote the price 
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elasticity under reform and 'ig  the simulated (predicted) donation.  Then the predicted 
level of giving under reform can be computed as:7 
 ' 'exp( (ln ln ) ln )i i i ig P P gε= ⋅ − +  (2.14) 
This approach assumes that the other covariates do not change under the proposed 
reform.  Demographic variables like age, education, race, and number of children clearly 
do not change.  After tax income does change, but this is not a problem since I use pre-
tax income in my estimates.   
I consider three major reforms of the current system:  eliminate the deduction, 
extend the deduction to non- itemizers, and allow a 20% tax credit for all donations 
capped at the federal tax liability.  Table 2.10 contains aggregate changes in total giving 
and tax revenue based on 2003 data.  Columns 1 and 2 contain total donations and tax 
payments under the current law where only itemizers can deduct charitable donations.  
Using data from 2002, tax payments total $937 billion.  For comparison, the IRS reports 
that they received $ 797 billion from income taxes in 2002.  I attribute the difference to 
the fact that my tax calculations do not include all of the possible expenses an individual 
can itemize.  While I have data on itemized medical expenditures and charitable 
contributions, I do not know anything about mortgage interest payments or other itemized 
expenses.  Thus, I underestimate itemization, and overstate tax payments.  This is not a 
problem, however, since I am interested in the change in tax payments under each 
reform.  None of the reforms cause itemization of the other expenses to change, so the 
overall changes will remain the same.   
                                                 
7 A more precise approach would use all of the Tobit estimates to predict the conditional value of giving.  
I’ve done this as well and the results are equivalent.   
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Total current giving in 2002, $156 billion, differs slightly from the AAFRC Trust 
for Philanthropy estimate of $184 billion.  As explained by Wilhelm (2002), this is likely 
due to the different way the measures are created.  The COPPS data come from asking 
individuals how much they donate, while the AAFRC measures giving by itemizers from 
tax returns, and estimates giving by non-itemizers from the COPPS survey.   
For the first policy reform, consider what happens when the deduction for 
charitable contributions is eliminated.  This policy changes the price of giving to 1 for all 
taxpayers, and only affects the giving behavior of itemizers.  Columns 2 and 3 show that 
total donations decline by $47 billion (30%) under this policy, while tax revenues 
increase by $15 billion (10%).  Or, in the reverse, allowing itemizers to deduct charitable 
gifts creates an additional $47 billion in donations at a cost of $15 billion in tax revenue.   
The next policy reform extends the deduction to non- itemizers.  Under this policy, 
the price of giving for non- itemizers falls to 1 t− .  Columns 5 and 6 imply that total 
giving under this policy increases by $22 billion, while tax payments fall by $4 billion.  
This reform only affects tax payers who do not itemize under current law.  Thus, it is no 
surprise that the largest percent increases in giving, around 20%, come from taxpayers in 
the bottom two income groups, while taxpayers in the richest tercile increase giving by 
10%.   
Next, I consider eliminating the deduction and allowing all donors to receive a 
20% tax credit that cannot exceed the tax liability before the credit.  A tax credit changes 
the price of giving to 1-0.2 for all donors that receive the credit.  For all non- itemizers, 
this new price of giving is smaller than the current price.  This is also true for itemizers in 
the bottom two income groups.  The model predicts that these taxpayers have large 
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increases in giving under a tax credit.  Those in the middle tercile increase giving by $11 
billion (30%) and the poorest tercile gives $17 billion more (90%).  Itemizers in the 
richest tercile decrease giving under a tax credit because the new price of giving is larger 
than their current price.  Specifically, they decrease giving by $12.6 billion, or 13%.  
With a 20% tax credit total giving increases by $15.8 billion, and tax revenue falls by 
$16.8 billion.   
The largest overall increase in giving with the smallest decrease in tax revenue 
comes from allowing extending the deduction to non- itemizers.  The 20% tax credit is 
smaller than the average marginal tax rate of the richest tax payers, so those donors 
actually decrease giving with the tax credit.  Any tax credit must be larger than the 
average marginal tax rate of the rich (26.3%) in order to increase donations more than 
simply allowing everyone to deduct charitable donations.  However, a credit that large 
will also cause tax revenue to fall even more than under a 20% tax credit.  Thus, the least 
costly reform is to allow everyone to deduct donations. 
Table 2.10 illustrates how total giving changes with each reform.  The empirical 
results imply that each type of charity exhibits a different level of price responsiveness.  
Thus, it is not implausible that giving to each type of charity reacts differently to the 
reforms.  Table 2.11 contains the percent change in giving for each type of category 
under the three tax reforms.  The first row contains the percent change in total giving 
determined in the previous table.  The last row, ‘total gifts’, differs from the first because 
it is computed by adding up the predicted donations for each category, and then 
computing the percentage change.  This change of 17.7% is smaller than the change in 
gifts found from using the elasticity of giving to any charity.   
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If all donations are equally responsive, then the percent changes in column 1 for 
each type of charity should all equal 17.7%.  A quick glance indicates that this is not the 
case.  Eliminating the deduction causes religious donations to fall by 21%, gifts to needy 
and combo to fall by 15%, gifts to health and education to fall by 10%, and gifts to the 
arts to fall by 4%.  Interestingly, categories with the highest index values, or propensity to 
benefit the poor, experience the largest percentage declines in giving when the tax 
changes.  This indicates that the deduction does, at least, induce itemizers to give more to 
organizations that benefit the poor than to others.   
A similar pattern arises when the deduction is extended to non- itemizers.  Total 
giving increases by 7%, as does giving to religious, needy, and combo purpose 
organizations.  All others increase by smaller amounts (around 3-5%).  These patterns do 
not exactly hold across different income groups.  Since the first reform only affects 
itemizers, the richest tercile experiences much larger percent changes in giving than the 
other 2 groups.  Likewise, since allowing all to deduct only affect non- itemizers, the 
largest changes are in the bottom two income groups. 
Implementing a 20% tax credit produces varying results.  Total donations to 
health, education, and community groups all decrease, presumably because the bulk of 
those donations come from the highest earners.  The wealthiest taxpayers decrease giving 
to all categories, with the largest decrease going to religious, needy, and combo purpose 
organizations.   
All together table 2.11 illustrates that donations to specific categories do not react 
to tax changes equally.  Furthermore, the first panel provides evidence that the current 
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deduction causes larger increases in giving to groups that benefit the  poor than to other 
types of charities.  This result holds across all income categories. 
Next, I look at expenditure shares.  Religious donations comprise around 65-70% 
of total donations for all income groups.  Table 2.12 looks at the percent of giving to non-
religious charities.  Under current law, 55% of non-religious donations go to 
organizations that provide services to the needy or serve a combo purpose.  The next 24% 
go to health and education, while the arts receive 3.6%.  Eliminating the deduction causes 
the share of donations going to needy and combo to fall slightly, around 1 percentage 
point, while the other shares each increase by about .03%.  Thus, allowing itemizers to 
deduct contributions causes them to redistribute their giving (slightly) in favor of 
organizations that benefit the poor.  This table implies that the richest households are 
altruists, and the poorest households are egoists.  The largest non-religious donation 
shares for both income groups are to groups that benefit the needy or serve a combination 
of purposes.  The rich give the most to groups that benefit others (altruism), while the 
poor give the most to charities that benefit themselves (egoism).     
To determine if an income group gives disproportionately to a particular type of 
charity, compare the expenditure share for the given income group to the overall 
expenditure share for that type of charity.  For the most part, the expenditure shares 
across income groups are constant.  With no deduction, gifts to education make up 13% 
of total donations, and 15% of donations by the rich.  Only 6% of donations from the 
poor go to education.  Thus, the rich give a much larger proportion of their charitable 
contributions to education than the poor.  Another category with consistent differences is 
environment.  The overall expenditure share is 2.7%, however the poorest households 
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only give 1.9% and the middle households give 3.4% of their total non-religious 
donations to the environment. 
Finally, I examine the distribution of giving to a type of charity by income.  The 
first row of Table 2.13 contains the distribution of after tax income across income 
categories.  The poorest third receive 11.4% of net income, the middle third receive 
24.8%, and the richest third receive 63.8%.  I compare this income distribution to 
distributions of giving across the three income groups.  If the distribution of giving is the 
same as the distribution of income, then all income groups donate proportional amounts.  
If the percent of donations to a type of charity for a given income group is greater 
(smaller) than that income groups share of total income, then that income group gives 
disproportionately more (less) than the other income groups.  The distribution of total 
giving is exactly the same as the distribut ion of net income, and the distributions of 
giving to religious, needy, combo, and health are all close to the income distribution.  
Education and arts groups both exhibit stark departures from the income distribution.  
While the richest income tercile has 64% of after tax income, they make 71% of 
donations to the arts, and 77% of donations to education charities.  The poor give more 
than their share of the income distribution to international charities, while the middle 
income group gives disproportionately more to community groups, charities that provide 
youth and family services, and the environmental charities.  Interestingly, with no 
deduction the richest taxpayers provide 63% of total donations to the needy.  When 
itemizers can deduct donations, this share rises to 66%.  With a tax credit the proportion 
of donations to the needy by the rich falls to 60.6%.  This table, along with the previous 
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2, provides evidence that the current law encourages donors to give more charities that 
benefit the poor.   
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 My results indicate that donations to different types of charities do not exhibit the 
same price and income elasticities, and that the price elasticities are not constant across 
income.  Specifically, I find evidence of altruism for the richest taxpayers and egoism for 
the poorest taxpayers.   Donations by high income individuals to charities that benefit the 
poor are more price elastic than donations to charities that benefit themselves. Likewise, 
the most price elastic categories for low income individuals are charities that they use or 
benefit from.   
I use the price elasticity estimates to simulate total giving to each type of charity 
under various tax reforms, I find evidence that the current tax deduction induces itemizers 
to donate more to charities that benefit the poor than they would have given without the 
deduction.  Allowing itemizers to deduct contributions causes them to redistribute their 
giving (slightly) in favor of organizations that benefit the poor.  The largest non-religious 
donation shares for both income groups are to groups that benefit the poor.  The rich give 
the largest percent of non-religious donations to groups that benefit others (altruism), 
while the poor give the most to charities that benefit themselves (egoism).
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CHAPTER 3. TOBACCO TAX INCIDENCE 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1864, the federal government implemented the first excise tax on tobacco at a 
rate of 0.8 cents per pack of 20 cigarettes.  The federal rate grew to 39 cents per pack in 
2005.  States levy their own tobacco taxes on top of the federal rates.  Excise taxes on 
cigarettes can provide a significant source of revenue for governments, in large part due 
to the addictive nature and hence relatively inelastic demand for tobacco products.  Many 
states justify these taxes as a correction for an externality caused by the detrimental 
effects of second-hand smoke, and to compensate the states for the high cost of state-
funded health care for smokers.  Some simply acknowledge that taxes on tobacco are a 
good deterrent to prevent potential smokers from ever forming the habit.   
Aside from the justification, it is important to know who actually pays the tax.  If 
the tax is entirely passed on to the consumers, the literature on cigarette demand tells us 
that smoker participation will fall – especially amongst the most price sensitive, 
teenagers.1  Studies that estimate demand generally use the excise tax as a proxy for the 
price of cigarettes, and then assume that the price and tax have a one-to-one relationship.  
If this is not the case, projections of smoking cessation from a tax change based on these 
studies may be incorrect.  Several studies have shown that the tobacco industry may be 
imperfectly competitive, which may allow the firms to increase prices by more than a tax.  
Thus, it is important to understand how this tax affects the final retail price of cigarettes.   
                                                 
1 Chaloupka (1991), Becker and Murphy (1998), and Evans et al (1999) all estimate short run price 
elaticities of approximately -0.3 to -0.4 for the general population, and –0.8 to –1.0 for teenagers. 
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 This analysis seeks to determine the incidence of tobacco excise taxes, and it fills 
in several gaps in the existing literature.  First, I use more current data than any other 
study of tobacco tax incidence, and I find evidence that the ability of manufacturers to 
overshift the tax onto consumers has fallen over time.  Second, I control for potential 
border crossing, or “bootlegging” across states to avoid paying higher taxes.  Third, this 
is the first study of the tobacco tax incidence to allow for a dynamic specification. This 
specification indicates that the tax is undershifted in the short-run and over-shifted in the 
long-run.   
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 analyzes the 
relationship between market structure and tax incidence.  In section 3, I discuss previous 
estimates of tax incidence in the tobacco industry.  The underlying theoretical framework 
and empirical specification is described in section 4.  Next, the fifth section describes the 
data on tobacco prices and taxes for each state from 1954-2005, available from the 
Tobacco Institute (1989) and the Centers for Disease Control.   Estimation results are 
presented and discussed in Section 6.  Finally, Section 7 concludes.   
2.  MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH TAX INCIDENCE 
To determine the economic incidence of the tobacco tax, it is first important to 
understand the statutory incidence.  Tobacco manufacturers pay the federal excise tax and 
sell their products to distributors.  All distributors must obtain a license to operate in a 
particular state, where they are then required to pay the state excise tax.  Thus, 
manufacturers may be able to price discriminate based on the level of the state tax.  
Sumner (1981) shows that distributors cannot arbitrage between these prices.  Finally, 
distributors sell their product to various retail outlets, where consumers purchase the 
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tobacco.  The final retail price can include markups at all three levels of the chain.  In 
addition, states levy sales taxes on tobacco products.  This analysis, however, is solely 
concerned with the incidence of the excise taxes, and sales taxes are ignored.  
 The purpose of this analysis is not to determine the structure of the tobacco 
industry.  However, the existing market structure may imply something about the 
incidence of the tax.  I consider three cases.   
Case 1:  Perfect Competition 
 First consider the extreme of perfect competition.  A profit-maximizing perfectly 
competitive firm faces a given price p and chooses quantity q to maximize profits: 
 max ( )
q
pq c q tq− −  
where ( )c q  is the cost function, and t is the unit excise tax on tobacco products.  At the 
optimum p c t′= + , which says that price is set equal to marginal cost plus the tax rate.  
Thus, an increase in the excise tax has the same impact on price as a change in marginal 
cost.  This is depicted graphically in Figure 3.1. Under perfect competition, the following 
relationship always holds: p t∆ = ∆ . 
Case 2:  Oligopoly 
Let each firm i acting in an oligopoly maximize profit according to: 




p Q q c q tq− − , 
where iiQ q= ∑ represents industry wide output, and ( )p Q  represents the inverse 
demand function.  Then, the first order condition states that 0p q p c t′ ′+ − − = , and the 
























.  The relationship between price and tax is dependent on the 
number of firms ( N ), the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function (η ), and 




>  requires that 0kη + < .  Thus, for certain functional forms of demand and 
marginal cost, oligopolists can have either p t∆ ≥ ∆ , or p t∆ ≤ ∆ . 
Case 3:  Monopoly 
 Finally consider the other extreme of pure monopoly.  A monopolist can overshift 
or undershift, depending on the shape of the demand curve.  To see this, note that the 




>  requires that 1 0kη− < + < .  With a linear demand curve, 0η = , the monopolist 
always undershifts the tax, as shown in the first part of Figure 3.2.  Conversely, if the 
demand function exhibits constant elasticity, the monopolist always overshifts as 
depicted in the lower part of Figure 3.2.  Thus, the specification of the demand function 
dictates the tax incidence for a monopolist.     
 As summarized in Table 3.1, determining the relationship between price and tax 
can tell us something about the market structure.  Evidence of market power exists 
whenever price and tax do not exhibit a one-to-one relationship.  While perfect 
competition implies that p t∆ = ∆ , observing a one-to-one relationship does not imply 
perfect competition. 
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 In 1998, 46 states and the four largest tobacco manufacturing firms signed what is 
known as the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).  The agreement exempted the 
tobacco manufacturers from all further lawsuits.  In return, the four firms agreed to 
numerous restrictions on their advertising and to pay the states billions of dollars each 
year for perpetuity.  Each firm pays their 1997 market share of a predetermined amount 
for each year.2  However, “volume adjustments” allow the payments to increase when 
industry sales go up, or to decrease when overall consumption falls.  Note that the 
payments are dependent on industry sales.  This means that a particular firm will 
experience an increase in payments only if overall sales increase.  The following is an 
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. (3.2) 
In year t, for the 4 firms in the settlement, each firm i  must pay its share of the market in 
1997 1997( )ishare  multiplied by the predetermined total dollar amount for year t 
( )tAmount , and adjusted by the ratio of the actual industry-wide sales volume in year t 










= ×  
 
represent the factors that firm i  cannot change in year t.  
Then, it it t it t it itPayment Volume Q qφ φ φ= = = ∑ .  Suppose industry sales increase by 100 
units in year t, and that all of this increase is done by firm j with 1997 60%jshare = .  Then,  
                                                 
2 The four tobacco manufacturers and their 1997 market shares are Philip Morris (69%), Brown and 
Williamson (17.9%), Lorillard (7.3%), and RJ Reynolds (6.8%). 
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100 0.6jt tPayment Amount= × × .  The firm only experiences a payment increase based on 
its 1997 market share, even if it sold all of the extra cigarettes.  Thus, the MSA annual 
payments behave like a unit excise tax and all of the previous analyses apply to the MSA 
payments as well. 
3.  PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF TAX INCIDENCE AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR 
 Much of the research concerning excise taxes on tobacco and cigarettes 
concentrates on the effect the taxes have on consumer demand and on firm behavior.  
Few studies attempt to determine the economic incidence of the tax. 3  They may do so 
indirectly, but this is not the question with which they begin.  Table 3.2 contains a brief 
overview of this literature. 
 Barzel (1976) theorizes that a unit tax on any good causes an increase in the final 
price by an amount greater than the initial tax, regardless of the underlying market 
structure.  He argues that taxation induces firms to increase the quality of the taxed good, 
resulting in increased prices.  Using tobacco data, he tests this theory and finds that the 
retail price of tobacco increases by an amount greater than the tax.  In particular, he finds 
that the increase is equal to the tax rate times 1.065, and that this estimate is significantly 
different from 1.  Barzel finds it difficult to tell if the resulting price increase is a tax 
burden on consumers, or if it merely reflects a change in quality. 
 Johnson (1978) notes that Barzel does not control for state fixed effects, which 
implicitly assumes tha t tax rate differences cause all of the price variation between states.   
                                                 
3 I am concerned with the sharing of the incidence between consumers and producers.  Many studies do 
examine the distributional incidence of the tax across consumers, including Gruber and Koszegi (2004) and 
Lyon and Schwab (1995). 
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However, Johnson claims, considerable variation exists across states in the price net of 
the tax, largely as a result of differences in local distribution costs.  Once state fixed 
effects are included in the model, the coefficient on tax increases to 1.101.    
 The tobacco industry may not have been the best industry for Barzel to test his 
theories, as many economists believe this industry exhibits evidence of market power.  
Temnant (1971), Tollison and Wagner (1988) and Bulow & Klemperer (1998) each note 
evidence of collusion on price by cigarette manufacturers.  In the Tobacco Case of 1946, 
the government convicted tobacco manufacturers of operating an illegal cartel in the 
1930’s.  According to Harris (1987), the “consensus has been that company behavior was 
not changed by the verdict” (p. 99).  Harris presents data on price changes by the six 
major firms in the early 1980’s and makes an argument for price collusion.  He goes so 
far as to assert that the price increase after the 1983 federal excise tax increase was not 
caused by the tax change.  Instead, the tax increase allowed the six firms to raise prices 
while allowing consumers to believe that the increases were due to the higher tax.  The 
assertion that is that prices rose by amounts greater than the tax during this period, while 
costs did not experience the same increases.   
 Sumner (1981) and Sullivan (1985) each try to estimate market power in the 
tobacco industry.  Since data on marginal costs are not readily available, they instead use 
price and tax data to determine the markup over the tax.  Any estimated relationship not 
equal to 1 rules out perfect competition, while a one-to-one relationship could occur 
under either perfect or imperfect competition. 
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 Sumner begins with the usual equilibrium pricing condition that marginal revenue 










 , where jη  is the elasticity of the firm level 
demand for firm j , jp  is price, and jMC  represents marginal cost.  Because unit excise 
taxes increase marginal costs linearly, Sumner uses the tax rates as a proxy for the 
unobserved marginal cost to estimate the shifting parameter.  Using panel data over states 
and years, Sumner regresses retail price on the tax in each state and controls for state and 
year fixed effects.  He finds that a 10 cent tax raises retail price by 10.74 cents, which 
implies a firm level demand elasticity of -13.5.  Since firms in a perfectly competitive 
market experience a firm level demand elasticity equal to −∞ , he claims that this result 
provides evidence of market power.  At the time, Sumner’s paper was cited as an 
“ingenious”4 approach to determining market power in the absence of marginal cost data, 
and it is widely recognized as developing the methodology for determining tax burden 
under imperfect competition.5  However, Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) demonstrate that 
the results are sensitive to a restrictive assumption about the functional form of demand.  
Specifically, the firm-level demand must exhibit constant elasticity in order for the firms 
to pass on a constant fraction of cost in the price, and constant elasticity demand implies 
overshifting. 
 Sullivan (1985) generalizes Sumner’s procedure to work for any functional form 
of demand by estimating a model of conjectural variations.  His estimates indicate that a 
10 cent tax increase causes price to go up by 10.89 cents.  Using this result, Sullivan 
determines that the industry behaves as if it contains 2.55 firms (or cartels acting as 
                                                 
4 See Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) page 182. 
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firms).  With six major tobacco companies in existence at that time, Sullivan claims that 
this finding indicates some level of collusion among those firms.   
Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) also estimate the amount of a cigarette tax passed 
on to consumers.  Using data from 1985-1996, they regress price on tax, controlling for 
both state and year.  They find that the tax is shifted onto consumers by 1.01 in nominal 
terms, and by 0.92 in real dollars.  Unlike the earlier studies, they find near perfect 
competition.  However, they note that the coefficient on the tax rate in nominal dollars 
becomes 1.13 when using data from 1971-1996.  Perhaps the market power that once 
seemed prevalent in the tobacco industry has diminished over time.  If so, the ability of 
the manufacturers to pass the tax on to consumers has diminished as well.  This analysis  
uses data that is even more recent, so it will be of interest to see if the overshifting of the 
tax to consumers falls even more.   
 Barnett et al (1995) use data from 1955 to 1990 to estimate incidence using a 
three stage least squares conjectural variation model of the cigarette industry.  They 
simulate the effects of state and federal excise taxes separately and find that federal taxes 
cause much larger increases in price than state taxes, likely because state taxes can be 
more easily avoided by border crossing and smuggling.  Keeler et al (1996) control for 
border crossing and anti-smoking legislation using data from 1960-1990 and find that a 
10 cent tax increase causes price to rise by 11.1 cents. 
 Delipalla & O’Donnell (2001) utilize data on cigarette taxes in 12 European 
countries to estimate market power and tax incidence in the cigarette industry.  These 
nations impose both unit excise taxes and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes.  They find 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Besley and Rosen (1999) and Porterba (1996). 
 65 
evidence of undershifting for both types of taxes in some countries, and that the unit tax 
always has a greater effect on price than the ad valorem taxes.6   
 Taken together, these studies do find evidence of overshifting of the tax, and 
consequently, of market power in the tobacco industry.  Interestingly, studies that use 
data from more recent years find coefficients closer to one.  The most current uses data 
only up until 1995, and only Keeler et al (1996) control for possible border crossing 
activity.  None of them include data from after the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998, 
which Bulow and Klemperer (1998) note spurred manufactures to increase prices rapidly 
early that year in an attempt to offset the future payouts required by the settlement.  In 
addition, the payments required by the MSA have the same effect on pricing as a federal 
excise tax.  My analysis fills in these gaps in the literature by using data from 1954-2005 
and by controlling for border crossing activity.  I also take into account the dynamic 
relationship between price and tax to compute both short-run and long-run effects.  
4.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  
I present a very simple model to help motivate the econometrics.  This “model” is 
based on the framework used by Besley and Rosen in their 1999 examination of sales tax 
incidence, with appropriate adjustments for a unit tax.  Consider a tobacco firm operating 
in state j  at time  t .  The firm can be thought of as the combination of manufacturers,  
                                                 
6 These results are not directly applicable to the tax treatment of tobacco in the US for several reasons.  
First, taxes are required by the European Union to be greater than or equal to 70% of the price, while taxes 
comprise around 30% of the price in the U.S.  Second, in about half of the included countries, the 
government maintains control of domestic production of cigarettes.  Certainly, an industry under 
government control will price differently than private manufacturers who are thought to collude. 
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distributors, and retailers that together set the final consumer price.  Assume that the 
tobacco firm maximizes profits through its choice of quantity  jtq   .   
Profit is represented by the difference between revenues ( ; )jt jt jtR q z  and costs  
( ; , )jt jt jt jtC q z τ , where jtz  represents the behavior of other firms in the market, and jtτ  is 
the unit tax rate on tobacco products (in state j  at time t ).  Assume that the firms make 
choices to form a Nash equilibrium with equilibrium values * *( , )jt jtz q  where 
* ( )jt jt jtz z τ=  
and * ( )jt jt jtq q τ= .  Thus the choice of output, and hence price, is a function of the tax.  
The solution to this problem can be expressed as: 
 ( )jt jt jt jtp mφ τ= ⋅ +  (3.3) 
where 
 jtp = tax-inclusive price of tobacco in state  j  at time  t, 
jtφ = mark-up on tobacco in state  j  at time  t, and   
jtm = marginal production cost of tobacco in state  j  at time  t. 
This formula says that price is equal to a mark-up over marginal cost.7  In a perfectly 
competitive industry, the mark-up factor is equal to 1, and price equals marginal cost plus 
the tax.  Furthermore, the mark-up parameter jtφ  and possibly the marginal cost jtm  are 
also functions of the tax.  Equation (3.3) can then be written as: 
 ( , )jt jt jt jtp f τ θ=  (3.4) 
                                                 
7 I am not using the mark-up parameter to estimate anything about the market structure.  Instead, I am 
interested in the shifting of the tax between manufacturers and consumers.  While this method has been 
criticized as relying on constant elasticity demand, I am not using the results to infer a market elasticity. 
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where jtθ  represents a vector of factors that affect the underlying cost of production or 
distribution, which typ ically vary across location and over time.  According to Sumner 
(1981), prices vary little across brands within each market, indicating that that the 
marginal cost of producing tobacco is likely the same across manufacturers.  In addition, 
domestic tobacco is largely produced with a single technology in three states (KY, NC, 
and VA).  Thus, the marginal production cost in this story can be interpreted as the cost 
of physically moving the tobacco product from a distributor to a retail outlet.  Keeler et al 
(1996) proxy for this cost with a measure of the distance of each state from the tobacco 
producing region.  Most others, however, simply use state and year fixed effects to 
capture these costs.8  With this in mind, cost variables are not used in this analys is.  
Given all of these assumptions, which eliminate the need for cost controls, the regression 
equation becomes: 
 jt jt j t jtp STATE YEARβτ γ δ ε= + + +  (3.5) 
where jSTATE  and tYEAR  represent fixed effects for state and year, respectively, and ε jt 
accounts for any unobserved effects on price.  I assume that E(ε jt|τjt) = 0, and that the 
error term is normally distributed.  The state fixed effects reflect variations in local 
distribution costs, and the year effects capture changes in the macroeconomic 
environment that are assumed to affect costs in every state the same way.  Federal excise 
tax changes are subsumed by the year effects. 
 The important parameter in this equation is β .  If the excise tax is fully passed on 
to consumers, it should be equal to 1.  Any value of β  that is not equal to 1 provides 
                                                 
8 For example, see Johnson (1978) or Evans et al (1999). 
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evidence of imperfect competition.  A value less than 1 indicates that the tax is shared 
between consumers and producers (undershifting).  Similarly, β  greater than 1 implies 
overshifting, assuming that price and tax have the same relationship in every state.  This 
last assumption may be too restrictive, and so possible ways of relaxing this assumption 
are discussed later in the chapter.  In addition, some form of market dynamics may 
influence prices.  Firms do not necessarily respond to changes instantaneously.  It takes 
time to enter or exit a market, and to change capacity choices.  For this reason, a dynamic 
version of the basic equation is also estimated. 
5.  DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
 Price and tax data for every state from 1954 to 1988 are obtained from The Tax 
Burden on Tobacco, published by the Tobacco Institute (1988).  For the years 1989 to 
2005, the data are obtained from the Center for Disease Control website, which contains 
the information from the Tobacco Institute,9 for a total of 2,652 observations.10  Price is 
defined as the weighted-average price per pack. The Institute uses weights for length of 
cigarette (regular, king, 100mm) and for type of transaction (carton, single pack, 
machine).  Wholesalers from around the country provide the institute with estimates of 
the average retail price in their area for each type of cigarette and type of sale.  The 
institute then turns these numbers into state averages for each year.  According to the 
institute, cigarette sales account for roughly 98% of tax collections on tobacco, which 
implies that data on cigarette taxes are representative of the entire tobacco market.  The 
                                                 
9 See http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/StateSystem/index.aspx. 
10 Note that data from Hawaii and Alaska are only available from 1960-2005. 
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tax variable includes both state and federal taxes, but does not include any city- level 
tobacco tax.  Data from the CPI are used to convert all variables into real 2005 dollars.11   
 Figure 3.3 depicts the history of the United States federal excise tax rate on 
tobacco products.  The nominal federal tax rate shows no change for thirty years from 
1954 to 1983, remaining at a constant 8 cents per pack.  After the 1983 increase to 16 
cents, the rate changes 4 more times: to 20 cents in 1991, to 24 cents in 1993, to 34 cents 
in 2000, and finally to 39 cents in 2002.  This tax rate does not provide much variation 
for econometric purposes.  Fortunately, the figure indicates that average state excise tax 
rates change more frequently. 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the spatial distribution of average prices and tax 
rates over the entire sample, 1954-2005, measured in real 2005 dollars.  States in the 
tobacco producing region have both the lowest prices and the lowest tax rates, while the 
largest prices and taxes occur in the northeast and north central states. The distributions 
of price and tax across the states are nearly identical.  Thus, most of the variation in retail 
prices is due to the differences in excise taxes across states.  In 2005, the most recent year 
available, the average retail price of cigarettes varied from $3.15 in South Carolina to 
$5.64 in the state of Rhode Island.  Not surprisingly, the largest state tax rate in 2005 
($2.46 / pack) occurs in Rhode Island, and the smallest state tax rate ($0.07 / pack) occurs 
in South Carolina.   
This analysis is concerned with the relationship between retail price and the tax 
rate.  Figure 3.6 plots the mean price and tax rates in cents, for each year in the sample, in 
real dollars.  Until the 1980’s the price reflects changes in the tax rate almost one for one.  
                                                 
11 CPI data are obtained from http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm. 
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After this period, the price rises by amounts greater than the tax.  The class action law 
suits against the tobacco manufacturers began in 1996 coinciding with the start of the 
upward tick in price.  In 1998, the tobacco manufacturers signed the Master Settlement 
Agreement and began to increase their prices in anticipation of the large future payouts 
they would have to make to the states.  Furthermore, as shown in section 2 these 
payments act as a federal excise tax on tobacco.  Real tax rates remains nearly constant 
for the first twenty years of the data.  During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the tax rate 
again remains constant, while the real price increases rapidly.  The average excise tax in 
1954 was 80.6 cents.  By 1999 in real terms, this value was only 76 cents.  Over the next 
5 years a series of both federal and state tax increases increased the average tax to 131 
cents per pack.   
6.  ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 The first row of Table 3.3 contains the results from estimating equation (3.5) for 
both nominal and real values.  Since the panel is unbalanced (Hawaii and Alaska do not 
enter the dataset until 1960), standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent.  Nominal 
values are used in column (1), since states change nominal tax rates, and real 2005 dollars 
are used in column (2) to make comparisons over time.  For the entire 1954-2005 sample, 
the estimates imply that a 10 cent tax increase causes price to rise by nearly 12 cents.  
The nominal and real estimates are not statistically different from each other.   
Evans et al. (1999) note that the ability of tobacco firms to pass the tax onto 
consumers may diminish over time.  From Figure 3.6, the one-to-one relationship 
between price and tax appears to change during the 1980’s.  With this in mind, the model 
is estimated omitting the first 5 years, the first 10 years, the first 15 years, and so on until 
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2001-2005.  The coefficient on tax decreases as older years are omitted, and conversely 
increases as earlier years enter the sample.  The coefficient is significantly greater than 1 
for all but the 1996-2005 and 2001-2005 samples.  While its lowest value, 1.004 for 
2001-2005, still indicates the tax is shifted fully onto consumers, it seems that the ability 
to overshift disappears over time.  To test this, I estimate equation (3.5) for mutually 
exclusive sets of years.  Panel B of Table 3.3 contains the results of this exercise.   
The 1954-1965 and 1966-1975 samples show evidence of overshifting, with 
coefficients in the real dollars estimation of 1.117 and 1.127, respectively.  Becker et al 
(1994) claim that producers increase prices when taxes go up in order to obtain more 
profit from current smokers and offset losses from an expected decline in future smoking 
participation.  This behavior is consistent with a monopolist facing constant elasticity 
demand, or an oligopolist with appropriate restrictions on the cost and demand functions.  
Conversely, when few nominal tax changes are legislated, and the real value of the tax 
falls, manufacturers may share some of the tax burden with consumers in order to 
increase levels of smoking participation.  The tax is undershifted, with a coefficient of 
0.803, between 1976 and 1983 when nominal taxes are fairly constant and real taxes fall.  
Also, from section 2, undershifting is consistent behavior for a monopolist facing a linear 
demand function.  The largest amount of overshifting occurs between 1986 and 1995, 
when a 10 cent tax increases is predicted to increase price by 12 cents.  This period is 
when many states began to increase tax rates rapidly.  Finally, the last decade has a 
coefficient greater than 1, but it is not significantly different from 1.  Many state tax 
increases occur in the late 1990’s, but they are often paired with other measures of 
tobacco control like indoor smoking bans.  Also, tobacco lawsuits and the federal tobacco 
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settlement in 1998 enabled the government to extract billions of dollars of revenue from 
the tobacco companies, with the first payments occurring in 2001.  In addition, it was 
hoped that the tobacco companies would have to raise their prices to finance the 
settlements.  Thus, while the statutory tax does not fully explain the large price increases 
in the last years of the sample, the total effective tax including the settlement payments 
may do so.   
 Next, I perform a series of robustness checks and tests to compare my results to 
earlier estimates.  Table 3.4 contains these results.  Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) show 
that unit taxes have a larger impact on prices than ad valorem taxes.  In my data, two 
states levy ad valorem taxes: HI and NJ.  Omitting NJ from the sample does cause the 
coefficient on tax to increase, though not by a significant amount.  Dropping Hawaii, 
however, actually yields a smaller coefficient.  This is probably because Hawaiian 
residents have little opportunity for border crossing activity.  Dropping either or both of 
these states causes a small enough difference from the baseline estimates that I am not 
concerned about any bias that their inclusion may cause. 
The relationship between price and tax may be very different in the three tobacco 
producing states (KY, NC, VA) than in the other 47 states and the District of Columbia.  
Since these three states have some of the lowest tax rates and highest smoker 
participation rates in the nation, it seems fair to believe that some other factors influence 
the relationship between price and tax.  When I estimate equation 3.3 without KY, NC, 
and VA, however, I obtain nearly identical results.  Thus the inclusion of the tobacco 
producing states does not bias the results presented in Table 3.3.   
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 Next, I split the tax variable into two separate variables as in Barnett et al (1995):  
one variable for the federal tax and one variable for the state tax.  In the base results, the 
effect of the federal tax is contained within the year dummies.  By design, the effect of 
the state tax remains unchanged.12  I find that the federal tax has a much larger impact on 
price, with a coefficient of 3.00 when using real dollars.  This means a 10 cent increase in 
the federal tax increases price by 30 cents (based only on time series variation).  
Manufacturers may be much more able to increase price when the federal tax changes 
because consumers are less able to avoid the tax through border crossing activities.  In the 
next sub-section I control for state level border crossing. 
 Finally, I add a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has a restaurant smoking 
ban in place and interact it with the tax for 1995-2005.13  States with restaurant smoking 
bans have prices that are an average of 9 cents less than states without bans.  This is 
reflective of the fact that states with bans have smaller demand on average (78 packs/year 
per capita) than states with no bans (93.5 packs/year per capita).  A 10 cent tax increase 
causes a larger price increase in states with bans (10.8 cents) than in states with no bans 
(9.9 cents).  Neither of these estimates are statistically different from the 1.055 baseline 
estimate from the 1996-2005 time period.   
6.1  BORDER CROSSING AND BOOTLEGGING 
If a state has neighbors with lower taxes, then residents can cross the border to 
purchase cigarettes.  This can cause demand to increase in the lower tax state.  The 
demand increase, in turn, can be expected to cause a price increase in the lower tax state 
                                                 
12 Year fixed effects are included in this regression as well. Including the federal tax as a separate variable 
simply reduces the coefficients on the year effects. 
13 The data for this variable are obtained from the CDC STATE system. 
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if the market is not competitive.  Lower tax areas may experience a surge in demand and 
price.  Likewise, high tax areas can lose demand and see prices fall.  Thus, it is not clear 
which direction border-crossing could bias the results. 
 The problem of border crossing, or bootlegging, is frequently mentioned in 
studies of tobacco demand.  Chaloupka and Warner (2001) contains an excellent survey 
of these studies.  Demand studies that control for border crossing either restrict the 
sample to states that do not have lower tax neighbors, or they use a weighted average 
price based on all taxes in a defined area.  Few incidence studies deal with smuggling.  In 
fact, I found only one study by Keeler et al (1996).  They include a measure of a state’s 
export potential, determined by both the percent of the population near the border and a 
measure of the savings to be had by crossing the border.  With this additional control, 
they still find that, on average, taxes are shifted within the taxing state at a rate of 1.11 
times the tax.   
I begin by creating a dummy variable (Bootleg) equal to 1 if the state has at least 
1 neighbor with a lower tax rate and equal to 0 otherwise.14  Figure 3.7 depicts the spatial 
distribution of this variable at three points in the sample: 1955, 1980, and 2005.  In 1955, 
15 states do not have a lower tax neighbor.  By 1980, this number falls to 9, and by 2005 
only 8.  The states with no bootlegging opportunities change over the sample, reflecting 
the numerous state tax changes.  In Figure 3.8, I plot average per capita sales in states 
with lower tax neighbors (Bootleg = 1) versus consumption in states with no lower tax 
neighbors (Bootleg = 0).  The states with no low-tax neighbors can be thought of as 
destination states and always have greater average sales than their higher tax neighbors.  
                                                 
14 Later, I create a measure of how much of the state’s population resides near a lower tax state. 
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Together, these descriptive statistics provide evidence that some border crossing does 
occur. 
In Table 3.5, I add an interaction of the tax and Bootleg to equation (3.5).  In 
states with lower tax neighbors, a 10 cent tax increase is predicted to increase price by 
11.9 cents.  Meanwhile, that same 10 cent tax increases price by 13.1 cents in the states 
with no lower tax neighbors.  The baseline results of 1.19 falls in between these two 
estimates.  The same is true for the real dollar estimates.  Thus, while the earlier results 
may understate the eventual impact of one low tax state’s tax on price, they overstate the 
impact in states with a lower tax neighbor.   
Using a state- level measure of border crossing is not ideal.  For example, 
Louisiana frequently has a lower state tax than Texas (so Texas is assigned Bootleg = 1).  
However, it is unlikely that residents of El Paso in western Texas drive the 880 miles to 
Louisiana to save a few cents or dollars on a pack of cigarettes.  For this reason, I create a 
second measure of border crossing potential equal to the percent of a state’s population 
that resides in a county adjacent to a state with a lower tax. 15  The numbers inside each 
state in Figure 3.7 represent this variable.  In 2005, Texas is designated as a potential 
border crossing state with the state level measure, yet only 2% of the state population 
lives in a county adjacent to a lower tax state.  As shown in Panel B of Table 3.5, using 
this variable yields coefficients that are smaller than those obtained with the state level 
measure.  A ten cent tax increase in a state with no low-tax neighbor is predicted to 
increase price by 12 cents, while a 10 cent tax in a state with Bootleg =1 causes price to 
increase by 11.5 cents.  As expected, using the county- level measure compresses the 
                                                 
15 County population data are obtained from the US Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1. 
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spread between the two types of border crossing states from the state results.  Altogether, 
while border crossing does increase demand in some low-tax areas, it does not bias the 
baseline results by a statistically significant amount with either the state- or county- level 
measure. 
6.2 DYNAMICS AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF TAXATION 
 Prices might not react to tax changes instantaneously.  None of the tobacco excise 
tax incidence literature takes this into account.  Besley and Rosen (1999), however, do 
account for dynamics in their analysis of general sales tax incidence by adding a series of 
lags to the regression.  First, I add lagged values of the tax rate to equation (3.5).  Many 
of the lagged coefficients are insignificant, due to the small amounts of variation in each 
cell.  Besley and Rosen point out that while the individual lag coefficients are not always 
significant, the sum of the lags and the tax coefficient can be interpreted as a long-run 
effect of the tax.  Table 3.6 contains results with 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30-year lags.  In all 
cases, the tax coefficient alone is not significantly different from 1, but the long-run 
impacts are significantly different from 1.  Depending on the number of lags, the long-run 
effect is bounded between 1.231 and 1.311.  This means a 10 cent tax increase causes a 
10 cent price increase immediately, and a 12.3 to 13 cents price increase further in the 
future.   
Applying a structure to the lags grants the ability to infer something about the lag 
length.  I impose the simplest lag structure, which is that the lags decline geometrically.  
After some algebraic manipulation, the new regression equation becomes: 
 , 1jt jt j t j t jtp p STATE YEARβτ λ ε−= + + + +  (3.6) 
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The coefficient on lagged price, λ , provides a measure of the rate of decay of the lag 
distribution.  A lower value of λ  indicates a faster rate of decay of the effect of prior 
price ( 0λ = implies instantaneous adjustment).  A faster rate of decay means that more of 
the impact of the tax occurs immediately.  The short-run impact of the tax is given by the 
coefficient on the tax ( )β , while the long-run effect is the short-run impact divided by 
(1 )λ− .  Results from this estimation are presented in Table 3.6.   
This procedure further implies that it takes time for the price to adjust fully to a 
tax hike.  In the regression with no lags, the real coefficient on tax over all years equals 
1.171.  Once the lags are introduced, this short-run value falls to .845.  The real lag 
coefficient equals .339, and it thus implies a lag length of 0.508 years.  This indicates that 
around half of the ultimate price reaction to the tax occurs in the year it is implemented.   
Likewise, the long-run effect of the tax is 1.274, which is considerably larger than the 
short-run value of 0.845.    
All of my results assume that the error term is uncorrelated over time.  I test for 
autocorrelation across the panels, and I am unable to reject the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation.  However, when I estimate a Prais-Winston correction for auto-
correlation with panel correlated standard errors, I get results that are greater than 1 and 
not significantly different from the baseline results.  Thus, I conclude that auto-
correlation is not a problem with my analysis. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This analysis  determines the proportion of a tobacco excise tax that is paid by 
consumers.  The basic results imply that the tax is fully shifted onto consumers, and in 
many cases the shifting coefficient is significantly greater than 1.  Dynamic estimates 
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indicate that consumers pay 130% of the tobacco tax in the long-run.  Border crossing 
may increase demand in low-tax areas and cause the price to increase by amounts greater 
than predicted in low-tax states, and may decrease demand and price in high- tax areas.  
However, my results indicate that bootlegging activity does not change the main results 
by a significant amount. 
Several additional factors may explain why the tax and price do not have one-to-
one relationship.  The tobacco industry is thought by many to exhibit imperfectly 
competitive behavior. In fact Sumner (1981) and Sullivan (1985) each arrive at similar 
results of overshifting when attempting to estimate the level of competition in the tobacco 
manufacturing industry.  Barzel (1976) claims that the tax increase induces the 
manufacturers to improve the quality of their product.  Under this hypothesis, the price 
increase reflects a higher level of product quality, not just the tax hike.  Becker et al 
(1944) claim that the overshifting is not surprising when consumers are addictive and the 
market is not competitive, writing “If smokers are addicted and if the industry is 
oligopolistic, an expected rise in future taxes and hence in future prices induces a rise in 
current prices even though current demand falls when future prices are expected to 
increase” (p. 413). 
My results also indicate that the ability of tobacco manufacturers and distributors 
to pass the tax on to consumers has changed over time.  Using data after 1996, price is 
predicted to change by the same amount as tax.  This is in large part due to the settlement 
between the states and manufacturers, which had the same effect as if the government 
increased the federal excise tax every year that a payment is required.  
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TABLE 1.1   ESTIMATES FROM PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Author (year) Data and Years 
Persons 
Considered Tax Marginal Effect 




SIPP 1989-1995 Initially 
unmarried 
women age 18-
50 with children  
Changes in EITC 
between married 
and not married 
No effect 




SIPP 1989-1995 Initially married 
women age 18-
50 with children 
Changes in EITC 
between married 






1990 SIPP Married women 
age 18-44 that 
eventually 
separate 




Marry or Cohabit 

















PSID Initial cohabiters 









     
Parentheses contain the tax-price elasticity of marriage where they are available.  The marginal effect is 
defined as ∂F(xb)/ ∂x where F(xb) is the distribution function evaluated at the mean values of the covariates 
X with coefficients b.  The elasticity of marriage with respect to the marriage tax is the percentage change 




TABLE 1.2   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HOUSEHOLD HEADS 
     
  Single Cohabit Married Separated 
N 13,796 2,033 25,978 2,201 
41.07 33.90 42.42 41.22 Age 
(12.25) (10.40) (10.85) (10.66) 
12.97 12.75 13.11 11.96 Education 
(2.83) (2.39) (2.92) (3.13) 
0.24 0.32 0.57 0.47 Any Kids (0 or 1) 
(0.43) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) 
0.41 0.52 1.11 0.92 Number of children <18 
(0.86) (0.90) (1.21) (1.23) 
0.20 0.16 0.10 0.30 Not White 
(0.40) (0.36) (0.30) (0.46) 
0.80 0.76 0.74 0.80 MSA (0 or 1) 
(0.40) (0.43) (0.44) (0.40) 
17,112.36 17,661.20 26,485.53 14,848.71 Own Earnings (2000 $) 
(19,830.86) (20,781.82) (27,804.27) (24,081.94) 
14,181.20 14,288.40 Partner Earnings (2000 $) 
 (14,119.07) (21,328.49)  
20,440.59   22,790.05 Imputed Partner Earnings (2000 $) 
(24,483.33)   (29,560.46) 
37,539.09 31,842.40 40,773.92 34,456.82 Total Earnings (2000 $) 
(25,056.10) (28,814.51) (36,189.13) (28,206.65) 
0.77 0.82 0.90 0.77 Partnerable men ratio 
(0.54) (0.51) (0.50) (0.48) 
0.61 0.45 0.14 0.67 Female 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.35) (0.47) 
87.98 184.20 -194.06 3.18 Tax Cost – Wife gets kids 
(1754.11) (1101.96) (1709.82) (1540.73) 
87.98 184.20 209.26 3.18 Tax Cost - Primary Earner gets kids 
(1754.11) (1101.96) (1224.18) (1540.73) 
     





TABLE 1.3   BIVARIATE PROBIT RESULTS 
 (1) (2) 
 Alone Marry 
   
TW  -6.41e-05** 
  (3.23e-06) 
Own Earnings -1.54e-06**  
 (2.44e-07)  
Partner Earnings 1.05e-06**  
 (3.20e-07)  
Partnerable Men Ratio -0.0004  
 (0.0105)  
Any Kids -0.796** 0.797** 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Number Kids < 18 -0.133** 0.199** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Age -0.010* 0.039** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Age2 -0.0003 -0.0002** 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Education -0.029* -0.019 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Education2 0.0002 0.002** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Not White 0.422** -0.275** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
MSA 0.061** -0.041* 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Female 1.334** -1.234** 
 (0.158) (0.146) 
Constant -0.081 -0.867** 
 (0.111) (0.111) 
   
Observations 43349 43349 
   
ρ = -0.918   
   
Standard errors are contained in parentheses.  ** Significant at 99% level of confidence. * Significant at 




TABLE 1.4   MARGINAL EFFECTS   
     
  Single Cohabit Married Separated 
TW 1.08E-06 1.18E-06 -1.18E-06 1.08E-06 
 (1.98) (1.98) (-1.98) (1.98) 
Own Earnings -2.41E-07 2.41E-07 3.06E-07 -3.06E-07 
 (-6.26) (6.26) (6.32) (-6.32) 
Partner Earnings 1.65E-06 -1.65E-06 -2.09E-06 2.09E-06 
 (3.29) (-3.29) (-3.29) (3.29) 
Partnerable Men Ratio -0.00005 0.00005 0.00007 -0.0007 
 (-0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) 
Any Kids -0.249 -0.021 0.293 -0.023 
 (-33.41) (-6.31) (33.71) (-6.47) 
Number Kids < 18 -0.054 -0.016 0.063 0.007 
 (-14.43) (-9.05) (14.21) (3.82) 
Age -0.005 -0.009 0.005 0.008 
 (-3.67) (-14.14) (3.21) (12.89) 
Age2 -1.68E-05 7.66E-05 -2.64E-05 -8.63E-05 
 (-1.05) (10.46) (-1.41) (-10.87) 
Education -0.0012 0.008 0.002 -0.009 
 (-0.39) (5.45) (0.57) (-5.60) 
Education2 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
 (-1.71) (-4.88) (0.57) (4.25) 
Not White Dummy  0.118 -0.017 -0.142 0.041 
 (17.41) (-7.92) (-19.22) (11.37) 
MSA 0.016 -0.002 -0.019 0.005 
 (3.29) (-0.94) (-3.32) (2.24) 
Female 0.444 0.002 -0.482 0.037 
 (95.91) (19.91) (-103.62) (16.06) 
     
Pij 0.255 0.054 0.630 0.061 
Marginal effects are calculated at the means according to the method outlined in Greene(1998) and indicate 
the percentage change in the alternative for a given unit change in the independent variable.  Pij is the 




TABLE 1.5   ALTERNATE SPECIFICATIONS & CHECKS FOR ROBUSTNESS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Single Cohabit Married Separated 
Base Case -6.41 1.08 1.18 -1.18 -1.08 
Fixed Effects      
  State -6.37 1.08 1.16 -1.16 1.08 
  Year -6.84 1.16 1.25 -1.25 -1.16 
  State & Year -6.87 1.17 1.25 -1.25 -1.17 
      
Total Earnings -6.02 1.02 1.10 -1.10 -1.102 
      
TPE -8.25 1.45 1.57 -1.57 -1.45 
      
Column (1) contains coefficients on the tax variable, while columns (2)-(5) contain the corresponding 
marginal effects.  The first row contains the ‘base’ case followed by 3 rows where I add in fixed effects.  
Next, I use total earnings in place of own earnings and partner earnings.  Then I estimate the ‘base’ model 





TABLE 1.6   SPECIFICATIONS FOR COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 Marginal Effect 
Marry – Not Marry for full sample  
Fixed Effects 




     State -6.34 
(-3.92) 
     Year -6.47 
(-4.02) 
     State & Year -6.51 
(-4.03) 
Marry – Not Marry for not alone persons   
Fixed Effects 




     State -9.43 
(-11.22) 
     Year -9.65 
(-11.22) 
     State & Year -9.20 
(-11.24) 
The dependent variable in both panels is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is married or not.  
The top panel considers the choice to marry for all household heads.  The bottom panel eliminates alone 
individuals and considers the choice to marry only for household heads that live with a partner.  Marginal 




TABLE 1.7   SIMULATION OF RESULTS BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
          
AGE 25 35 45 55 AGE 25 35 45 55 
White, 1 kid White, 0 kids   
P(single) 19% 14.9% 10.8% 7.5% P(single) 52.9% 46.9% 39.4% 32.1% 
P(cohabit) 9.8% 4.7% 2.6% 1.9% P(cohabit) 13.6% 8.2% 5.7% 5.0% 
P(married) 69% 76.2% 81.6% 86.3% P(married) 31.4% 39.9% 47.6% 55.3% 
P(separated) 2.2% 4.1% 5.0% 4.3% P(separated) 2.1% 5.0% 7.3% 7.6% 
          
Elasticity 0.0002 0.00009 0.00006 0.00004 elasticity 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
          
Not White, 1 kid   Not White, 0 kids   
P(single) 31.1% 24.6% 18.4% 13.5% P(single) 67.8% 61.2% 53.1% 45.1% 
P(cohabit) 8.1% 3.8% 2.1% 1.6% P(cohabit) 8.3% 4.8% 3.3% 3.1% 
P(married) 56.3% 63.5% 69.7% 75.9% P(married) 20.8% 26.9% 33.1% 40.3% 
P(separated) 4.5% 8.1% 9.8% 8.9% P(separated) 3.1% 7.0% 10.4% 11.5% 
          
Elasticity 0.0002 0.0001 0.00006 0.00004 elasticity 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
          
Each predicted probability is calculated for a high school graduate at the age, race, and number of children 
stated and all other variables set equal to their means.  The reported elasticity of marriage is with respect to 




TABLE 1.8   RESULTS BY TAX QUARTILE 
     
 75%-100% 50% - 75% 25% - 50% 0% - 25% 
Mean  $1,646.19 $380.53 -$195.25 -$2,154.66 
     
P(single) 19.6% 15.2% 13.6% 14.2% 
P(cohabit) 5.6% 4.8% 4.6% 4.7% 
P(married) 70.2% 75.9% 77.9% 77.2% 
P(separated) 4.6% 4.1% 3.8% 3.9% 
     
Elasticity 0.0028 0.0005 0.0002 0.0029 
     
Each predicted probability is calculated for a white 35 year old with 1 kid, at the tax listed in the column 




TABLE 2.1   SUMMARY STATISTICS, PSID 2001-2003 
     
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Age of Head 41.98 11.41 16 64 
Married 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Number of Kids 0.75 1.09 0 8 
Education of Head 13.28 2.71 0 17 
Male Head 0.71 0.45 0 1 
White Head 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Protestant 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Catholic 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Jewish 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Other Religion 0.37 0.48 0 1 
No Affiliation 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Own 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Emergency Food 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Itemize 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Donate to Charity 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Donate|Itemize=1 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Donate|Itemize=0 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Income 64,658.42 80,994.16 -59,948 3,660,650 
Federal + State MTR 22.28 13.31 -72.79 69.6 
Price(1-t) 0.879 0.154 0.304 1 
Price|Gifts>0 0.831 0.160 0.304 1 
Price|Gifts=0 0.965 0.093 0.536 1 
Price|Itemize 0.712 0.091 0.304 1 
     
Notes:  N=13,615 – Excludes Self-Employed, Farmers and age>64. 




TABLE 2.2   DONATION STATISTICS 
         
 All Income<31,000 31,000<Income<62,000 Income>62,000 
N 13,544 4,476 4,508 4,560 
         
 E(g|g>0) N E(g|g>0) N E(g|g>0) N E(g|g>0) N 
Gifts $1,826.81 6547 $892.78 1055 $1,110.45 2148 $2,569.77 3344 
Index Gifts 536.49 6433 261.30 1030 334.38 2111 748.49 3292 
Religious 1,697.68 4517 764.54 715 1,161.24 1455 2,282.01 2347 
Combo 508.78 2993 576.91 308 244.93 932 634.11 1753 
Needy 468.41 2715 363.56 344 297.16 800 579.57 1571 
Health 268.21 1783 114.01 175 175.98 505 339.46 1103 
Education 389.38 1430 125.28 121 160.25 358 514.49 951 
Social Services 474.04 3034 348.73 381 325.14 899 579.12 1754 
Other 351.17 1150 339.54 120 194.63 333 433.61 697 
Youth 216.21 577 99.66 52 245.64 172 218.05 353 
Arts 197.60 329 152.09 30 143.48 83 231.60 216 
Community 150.62 257 117.15 27 139.24 76 162.56 154 
Environment 150.11 367 101.12 23 95.68 97 178.14 247 
International 372.73 180 1,668.00 14 109.98 55 299.37 180 
         













Health Services 0.245 
Foundations 0.275 
Religious 0.287 
Social Services 0.498 
Source:  Author’s calculations.  See Appendix 2A for more detailed information. 
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TABLE 2.4   TOBIT ESTIMATES OF  LN (GIVING) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ln price -2.258*** -1.905*** -1.897*** -1.745*** -1.759*** 
 [0.094] [0.096] [0.096] [0.098] [.095] 
ln income 0.627*** 0.509*** 0.512*** 0.472*** 0.473*** 
 [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [.023] 
Age of head 0.0213*** 0.0238*** 0.0227*** 0.0203*** 0.0205*** 
 [0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [.0014] 
Married 0.245*** 0.487*** 0.473*** 0.427*** 0.416*** 
 [0.036] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [.039] 
Number kids 0.0500*** -0.0195 -0.0204 -0.0211 0.0171 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [.012] 
Year=2003 0.0774*** 0.0463** 0.0155 0.00462 0.001 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.036] [0.036] [.037] 
Education of 
head  0.142*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 
  [0.0074] [0.0074] [0.0074] [.0061] 
Male head  -0.287*** -0.258*** -0.261*** -0.258*** 
  [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [.041] 
White head  0.0037 0.0336 0.011 0.038 
  [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [.033] 
Protestant   0.495*** 0.482*** 0.473*** 
   [0.063] [0.063] [.053] 
Catholic   0.248*** 0.241*** 0.246*** 
   [0.071] [0.071] [.061] 
Jewish    0.298** 0.336*** 0.359*** 
   [0.13] [0.13] [.143] 
Other religion    0.349*** 0.331*** 0.321*** 
   [0.070] [0.070] [.059] 
Own    0.260*** 0.247*** 
    [0.040] [.035] 
Emergency 
food    -0.379*** -0.366*** 
    [0.089] [.091] 
state fixed 
effects no no no no Yes 
Observations 13483 12602 12602 12601 12601 
      
Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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TABLE 2.5   PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES BY CATEGORY 
      
 Price Income Observations 
 ε s.e. η s.e.  
Gifts -1.745*** [0.098] 0.472*** [0.028] 12601 
Index Gifts -1.336*** [0.075] 0.342*** [0.020] 12611 
Social Services -0.637*** [0.071] 0.222*** [0.019] 12636 
Religious -1.150*** [0.10] 0.220*** [0.026] 12661 
Needy -0.653*** [0.073] 0.200*** [0.020] 12644 
Combo Purpose -0.689*** [0.071] 0.296*** [0.020] 12660 
Health -0.379*** [0.061] 0.164*** [0.017] 12657 
Education -0.356*** [0.066] 0.180*** [0.019] 12660 
Arts -0.224** [0.099] 0.105*** [0.031] 6514 
Community -0.0456 [0.10] 0.108*** [0.028] 6513 
Youth & Family -0.108 [0.092] 0.138*** [0.027] 6509 
Environment -0.297*** [0.090] 0.136*** [0.024] 6512 
International -0.421*** [0.13] 0.104*** [0.039] 6515 
Other -0.253*** [0.073] 0.163*** [0.020] 12661 
      
Standard errors in brackets 




TABLE 2.6   COMPARING THE USE OF SPLINES IN PRICE AND INCOME FOR TOTAL 
GIVING 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Price -1.745 -1.884   
 [0.098] [0.10]   
Price 1   -3.110 -3.189 
   [0.44] [0.44] 
Price 2   -2.308 -2.172 
   [0.16] [0.16] 
Price 3   -1.525 -1.728 
   [0.20] [0.11] 
     
Income 0.472  0.507  
 [0.028]  [0.029]  
Income 1  0.497  -0.3 
  [0.052]  [0.21] 
Income 2  0.760  0.609 
  [0.078]  [0.034] 
Income 3  0.125  0.190 
  [0.048]  [0.054] 
     



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2.10   IMPACT ON TOTAL GIVING AND TAX COLLECTIONS UNDER VARIOUS REFORMS 
        
Change (in millions) 
 Current Law No Deduction All can deduct 20% Credit 
  G T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T ∆G ∆T 
              
Poorest Tercile 18987 6622 -1124 68 3818 -193 17193 -1495 
Middle Tercile 37939 110419 -8672 787 8954 -424 11290 -5788 
Richest Tercile 99024 820354 -37686 14278 9613 -3287 -12662 -9536 
              
Non-Itemizers 37700 238726 0 0 22385 -3905 25647 -8612 
Itemizers 118250 698669 -47482 15133 0 0 -9826 -8207 
              
Total 155950 937394 -47482 15133 22385 -3905 15822 -16819 
         
         
Percent Changes  
 Current Law No Deduction All can deduct 20% Credit 
  G T %∆G %∆T %∆G %∆T %∆G %∆T 
            
Poorest Tercile 18987 6622 -0.059 0.004 0.201 -0.010 0.906 -0.079 
Middle Tercile 37939 110419 -0.229 0.021 0.236 -0.011 0.298 -0.153 
Richest Tercile 99024 820354 -0.381 0.144 0.097 -0.033 -0.128 -0.096 
            
Non-Itemizers 37700 238726 0.000 0.000 0.594 -0.104 0.680 -0.228 
Itemizers 118250 698669 -0.402 0.128 0.000 0.000 -0.083 -0.069 
            
Total 155950 937394 -0.304 0.097 0.144 -0.025 0.101 -0.108 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2.12   SHARE OF GIVING TO EACH CATEGORY, BY INCOME,  UNDER REFORM 
       
 Current Law No Deduction 
 All Poor Middle Rich All Poor Middle Rich 
Needy 0.276 0.262 0.303 0.270 0.265 0.259 0.297 0.254 
Combo Purpose   0.274 0.290 0.249 0.279 0.263 0.289 0.244 0.266 
Health 0.115 0.108 0.121 0.115 0.118 0.108 0.122 0.119 
Education 0.126 0.057 0.102 0.145 0.128 0.058 0.103 0.151 
Arts 0.036 0.036 0.029 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.030 0.042 
Community 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.018 
Youth & Family 0.045 0.028 0.073 0.039 0.050 0.028 0.077 0.045 
Environment 0.027 0.019 0.034 0.026 0.028 0.019 0.036 0.027 
International 0.027 0.099 0.015 0.018 0.028 0.100 0.015 0.018 
Other 0.058 0.080 0.054 0.055 0.061 0.081 0.055 0.060 
       
 All can deduct 20% Credit 
 All Poor Middle Rich All Poor Middle Rich 
Needy 0.277 0.257 0.310 0.270 0.277 0.274 0.309 0.266 
Combo Purpose   0.279 0.299 0.251 0.284 0.273 0.290 0.254 0.276 
Health 0.114 0.104 0.120 0.114 0.114 0.103 0.116 0.115 
Education 0.125 0.057 0.100 0.144 0.123 0.060 0.098 0.145 
Arts 0.035 0.035 0.029 0.038 0.039 0.050 0.030 0.040 
Community 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.016 
Youth & Family 0.044 0.027 0.070 0.038 0.046 0.024 0.073 0.041 
Environment 0.027 0.020 0.034 0.026 0.028 0.019 0.036 0.026 
International 0.028 0.104 0.017 0.018 0.028 0.097 0.016 0.018 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3.1   IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICE AND TAX CONSISTENT WITH 
EACH MARKET STRUCTURE? 
Observed Relationship 









p t∆ = ∆  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p t∆ > ∆  No Yes No Yes 
p t∆ < ∆  No Yes Yes No 
TABLE 3.2   ESTIMATES FROM PREVIOUS LITERATURE 








    
Barzel (1976) 1.065+ 1954-1972 no state fixed effects
Johnson (1978) 1.101+ 1954-1972 state fixed effects
Sumner (1981) 1.074+ 1954-1978 omits AK, HI, NJ
Sullivan (1985) 1.089+ 1955-1982 quadratic effects
Barnett et al (1995) 0.976 1955-1990 simulation
Keeler et al (1996) 1.11+ 1960-1990 controls for border 
crossing and anti-
smoking regulations
Evans et al (1999) 0.92 1985-1996 state fixed effects
The symbol + indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at 
the 95% level of confidence. 
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 Nominal Real 
 (1) (2) 
1954-2005 1.194+ 1.171+ 
 (0.025) (0.019) 
1961-2005 1.191+ 1.167+ 
 (0.025) (0.020) 
1966-2005 1.186+ 1.164+ 
 (0.025) (0.021) 
1971-2005 1.179+ 1.157+ 
 (0.025) (0.022) 
1976-2005 1.169+ 1.152+ 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
1981-2005 1.151+ 1.135+ 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
1986-2005 1.127+ 1.111+ 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
1991-2005 1.088+ 1.068+ 
 (0.026) (0.027) 
1996-2005 1.055 1.039 
 (0.029) (0.032) 
2001-2005 1.012 1.004 
 (0.031) (0.033) 
   
Panel B.     
 Nominal Real 
 (1) (2) 
1954-1965 1.114+ 1.117+ 
 (0.026) (0.027) 
1966-1975 1.095+ 1.127+ 
 (0.024) (0.025) 
1976-1985 0.841 0.803 
 (0.067) (0.051) 
1986-1995 1.249+ 1.215+ 
 (0.045) (0.047) 
1996-2005 1.055 1.039 
 (0.029) (0.032) 
   
Notes:  Each row contains the results from the regression of price on tax with controls for state and year 
over the sample indicated in the first column.  Results are computed using both nominal values of the price 
and tax in column (1), and using constant 2005 dollars in column (2).  Parentheses contain 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  All coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 95% 
level of confidence.  The symbol + indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 95% 





TABLE 3.4   ROBUSTNESS AND SPECIFICATION CHECKS, 1954-2005 
   
 Nominal Real 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline 1.194+ 1.171+ 
 (0.025) (0.019) 
   
Changing the Sample 
Omit NJ 1.203+ 1.175+ 
 (0.028) (0.021) 
Omit HI 1.182+ 1.161+ 
 (0.025) (0.020) 
Omit NJ & HI 1.189+ 1.164+ 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
Omit KY, NC, VA 1.202+ 1.175+ 
 (0.026) (0.020) 
   
Include Federal Tax 8.148+ 3.000+ 
 (0.102) (0.057) 
State Tax 1.194+ 1.171+ 
 (0.025) (0.019) 
   
Controlling for Anit-Smoking Legislation (1995 - 2005) 
Restaurant Ban Dummy -8.960+ -9.904+ 
 (4.455) (5.081) 
Tax with no restaurant ban 0.993 0.982 
 (0.037) (0.042) 
Tax with a restaurant ban 1.081+ 1.065 
 (0.082) (0.035) 
Notes:  Parantheses contain heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  Unless otherwise noted, the 
sample includes all states from 1954-2005.  All coefficients are significantly different from zero at 10% 
level of confidence.  The symbol + indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 1.  
 102 
 
TABLE 3.5   CONTROLLING FOR POTENTIAL BOOTLEGGING 
   
Panel A.  State Level Measure of Bootlegging 
 Nominal Real 
 (1) (2) 
Tax (Bootleg = 0) 1.316 1.228 
 (0.031) (0.022) 
Tax × Bootleg -0.121 -0.067 
 (0.022) (0.019) 
Tax (Bootleg = 1) 1.196 1.160 
 (0.023) (0.020) 
   
Panel B.  County Level Measure of Bootlegging 
 Nominal Real 
 (1) (2) 
Tax (Bootleg = 0) 1.233 1.191 
 (0.035) (0.027) 
Tax × Bootleg -0.074 -0.044* 
 (0.032) (0.030) 
Tax (Bootleg = 1) 1.158 1.147 
 (0.021) (0.019) 
Notes.  Parentheses contain heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  All coefficients are significantly  




TABLE 3.6   ALLOWING FOR DYNAMICS WITH LAGS  
       
# of Lags 5 10 15 20 25 30 
       
Tax 1.055 1.054 1.041 1.034 1.017 1.001 
 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 
Long-Run 1.231+ 1.258+ 1.284+ 1.302+ 1.260+ 1.311+ 
 -0.028 -0.032 -0.041 -0.051 -0.066 -0.106 
              
Notes:  The first row contains the coefficient of the tax from the regression of price on tax and the number 
of lagged values of tax indicated at the top of the column.  Results are computed using constant 2005 
dollars.  The long-run effect is computed as the sum of the coefficient on tax and each of the lags.  
Parentheses contain standard errors.  All coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 95% level of 




TABLE 3.7   DYNAMICS WITH A GEOMETRIC LAG STRUCTURE 
   
 Nominal Real 
 (1) (2) 
Short-Run 0.786 0.845 
 (0.037) (0.294) 
Rate of Decay, λ  0.419 0.337 
 (0.033) (0.026) 
   
Long-Run 1.355 1.274 
Lag Length 0.722 0.508 
   
Notes:  Estimates of the effect of tax on price using a geometric lag structure 
according to equation (3.6).  The long-run effect is calculated as the short-
run effect divided by 1 λ− , where λ  represents the rate of decay.  The 
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NMj  where T
W  assumes that the woman 
receives custody of children upon divorce.  All measured in 2000 $. 
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FIGURE 3.2  TAX INCIDENCE UNDER A MONOPOLY 







































FIGUR E 3.3  HISTORY OF THE EXCISE TAX RATE ON TOBACCO 1954-2005 
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Notes:  The figure depicts average prices over 1954-2005 for each state measured in real 2005 












Notes:  The figure depicts average statutory tax rates over 1954-2005 for each state measured in 
real 2005 cents per pack of cigarettes.  
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FIGURE 3.8  AVERAGE SALES  PER CAPITA IN STATES WITH LOWER TAX 
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APPENDIX 1A.  SPOUSAL EARNINGS IMPUTATION EQUATIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Partner Earning Partner Earning if 
Male 
Partner Earning if 
Female 
Education -1,385.397 -425.928 -2,054.160 
 (15.39)** (5.09)** (12.74)** 
Education2 120.502 50.226 185.236 
 (31.70)** (14.29)** (26.98)** 
Experience 534.518 213.221 1,039.341 
 (38.99)** (15.71)** (44.85)** 
Experience2 -12.821 -5.812 -22.980 
 (60.98)** (28.70)** (62.75)** 
Msa 4,461.429 2,332.285 6,471.118 
 (32.84)** (17.59)** (28.13)** 
Black -2,714.121 1,991.835 -8,092.147 
 (11.16)** (8.47)** (19.46)** 
Other -1,867.066 -410.773 -3,198.289 
 (6.34)** (1.41) (6.51)** 
Own Earnings 0.004 0.031 0.054 
 (1.44) (14.98)** (8.75)** 
State Average Wage 608.700 87.230 1,070.638 
 (12.04)** (1.77) (12.49)** 
Minimum Wage 2,494.338 2,523.781 2,221.367 
 (12.49)** (12.97)** (6.55)** 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
-160.187 -74.842 -198.415 
 (3.30)** (1.58) (2.40)* 
_Iyear_1990 -572.796 -500.290 -507.583 
 (2.37)* (2.12)* (1.24) 
_Iyear_1991 -1,516.989 -1,322.343 -1,564.798 
 (5.98)** (5.35)** (3.63)** 
_Iyear_1992 -931.614 -351.289 -1,524.716 
 (3.56)** (1.38) (3.43)** 
_Iyear_1993 -825.369 56.081 -1,715.082 
 (3.34)** (0.23) (4.09)** 
_Iyear_1994 -858.595 398.430 -2,107.059 
 (3.57)** (1.70) (5.16)** 
_Iyear_1995 -271.226 893.341 -1,497.694 
 (1.12) (3.78)** (3.63)** 
_Iyear_1996 -86.454 -183.798 4.956 
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 (0.33) (0.72) (0.01) 
_Iyear_1997    
    
_Iyear_1998 125.852 465.247 -295.240 
 (0.44) (1.65) (0.60) 
_Iyear_1999 927.323 1,698.547 53.798 
 (3.15)** (5.93)** (0.11) 
Male -15,726.247   
 (127.36)**   
Constant 4,273.618 -5,375.599 -6,294.739 
 (4.56)** (6.01)** (3.88)** 
Observations 169758 84879 84879 
R-squared 0.21 0.11 0.19 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
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APPENDIX 2A.  CALCULATION OF INDEX VALUES  
 
Each index, bounded by 0 and 1, represents the fraction of recipients or users with low 
income multiplied by the fraction of expenditures spent on recipients.  To compute these 
values I use information from “Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?”, edited by 
Charles Clotfelter.  Unless noted otherwise, the poor are those with income less than 2 
times the poverty rate. 
 
Religious  
Index  = fraction of attendees in the bottom 2 income quintiles × 
fraction of money spent on sacramental activities 
=  .382 × .75 = 0.2865 
 
Note that this measure encompasses 75% of spending by religious organizations.  The 
other activities included general philanthropy and international/missionary work.  I do not 
consider the general philanthropy portion for two reasons.  First, I do not know what 
types of philanthropy the religious organization supports or who benefits from those 
funds.  Second, the PSID category for religious giving specifically asks respondents to 
separate giving to church sponsored philanthropy into the appropriate activity.  For 
example, donations to a church sponsored soup kitchen are reported as gifts to the Needy, 
not as gifts to Religious organizations. 
 
Health Services 
Index  = fraction of users of non-profit hospitals, nursing homes, mental health facilities, 
and substance abuse treatment programs that are poor × relative size + fraction of 
medical research that benefits the poor × relative size 
= 0.248 ×0.5 + 0.242 × 0.5 = 0.245 
 
Poor users of medical facilities are those with no insurance or Medicaid.  I assume medial 
research benefits everybody equally, and set the fraction of poor who benefit at the 
percentage of the population that are below 2 times the poverty rate.  If medical research 
does not benefit everyone equally (suppose research produces a new drug that cures a 
disease, but only the rich can afford it) the my measure will be biased upward. 
 
Education 
Index = fraction who attend non-profit secondary school that are poor × relative size of  
secondary education + fraction who attend non-profit universities that are 
poor × relative size of non-profit universities  
[0.09 × 0.08] + [0.20 × 0.69] = 0.1452 
 
Combined, secondary and university education comprise 75% of the non-profit education 
sector.  Of course, this measure does not take into account the spending by universities on 
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research as opposed to teaching.  If research activities do not benefit poor recipients as 
much as teaching, then my measure will be biased upward. 
 
Social Services 
Lester Salamon estimated the percent of expenditures that go to the poor using a 
proprietary survey of non-profits at the Urban Institute.  I multiply the fraction that goes 
to the poor by the relative size of the subcategory, and then sum them up to compute the 
index value (0.498).  The table shows the results: 
Category % to poor 
(estimated) 
Relative size of 
sector 
 
Housing 0.326 0.14 0.0456 
Social Services 0.439 0.31 0.1360 
Multiservice 0.42 0.31 0.1302 
Legal, advocacy 0.718 0.02 0.0143 
Employment/Training 0.554 0.29 0.1607 
Education/Research 0.162 0.26 0.0115 
Total   0.498 
 
Arts/Culture  
Index  = % of attendees with income less than 2 times the poverty rate  
 = 0.139 
 




For foundations, a survey asked what types of organizations they fund.  I combine those 
results with the previous index values and sum to get the index value (0.275). 
 
Category of Grantee % of Gifts Index 
Education 17.1 0.145 
Health 20.2 0.245 
Social Welfare 27.0 0.498 
Scientific Research 19.1 0.242 
Arts/Culture 14.5 0.139 
Religious 2.0 0.286 
Total  0.275 
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APPENDIX 2B.  PSID QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHARITABLE GIVING 
 
The following are the exact questions asked by the PSID interviewer.  For several 
categories the questioner gives specific examples of what is included in that type of 
donation. 
 
“Donations include any gifts of money, assets, or property/goods made directly to the 





Did you make any donations specifically for religious purposes or spiritual development, 
for example to a church, synagogue, mosque, TV or radio ministry?  Please do not 
include donations to schools, hospitals, and other charities run by religious organizations.  




Did you donate to any organizations that served a combination of purposes?  For 





Did you make any donations to organizations that help people in need of food, shelter, or 




Did you make donations toward educational purposes?  For example, colleges, grade 
schools, PTAs, libraries, or scholarship funds?  Please do not include direct tuition 




Did you make donations to organizations that provide youth or family services?—Such as 






Did you make donations to organizations that support or promote the arts, culture, or 
ethnic awareness?  Such as, to a museum, theatre, orchestra, public broadcasting, or 




Did you make donations to organizations that improve neighborhoods and communities?  




Did you make donations to organizations that preserve the environment?  Such as, for 




Did you make donations to organizations that provide international aid or promote world 




Did you make donations of money, assets, or property to charitable organizations with 
purposes other than those we just talked about? 
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